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French President Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970) was a controversial figure on the international 
scene during the Cold War. He steered an original and provocative course bordering on 
independence from the bipolar structure of post-1945 world politics. De Gaulle’s combination 
of national independence and a global appeal to state sovereignty casts a long shadow over 
foreign policy debates in France and in Europe. Although his references to the long run of 
geopolitics, to history or to “Grandeur” seemed to run against the course of history for many 
contemporaries, de Gaulle’s discourse can be linked up with timeless normative understandings 
between states. Self-determination, national legitimacy and independence are the precondition 
to a system whereby state consent creates norms.  
The present contribution concentrates on the legal arguments employed to support de 
Gaulle’s audacious speeches, travels and press conferences. My analysis aims to complement 
classical diplomatic history. Law is seen as a vector of consensus, used to attract partners in a 
horizontal normative environment. During the Cold War, vertical integration within ideological 
blocs was a consequence of military and strategic necessity. However, the balance of nuclear 
deterrence created political leverage for second-rank states, conformable to the fundamental 
legal values of liberty and equality as essential components of sovereignty within international 
                                                 
* The present article is based on a part of my doctoral dissertation in law, defended at Ghent University 
on 13 September 2013 (Balance of Power and International Law. European Diplomacy and the Elaboration of 
International Order, 18th Century and Post 1945, under supervision of Prof. D. Heirbaut). My thanks go to the 
members of the jury for their useful commentaries, as well as to the anonymous reviewers of the present 
contribution for Forum Historiae Iuris.  
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society. Sovereignty can be seen as a pretext to undermine collective structures, but is a recall 
of states’ double quality as both legal subjects and norm creators. The common liberty of all 
actors in the international arena is a bulwark against top-down descending unification. Bottom-
up legitimated notions of justice and law resurface when we analyse primary sources in detail. 
Pragmatic political discourse and normative legal discourse are constantly cross-disseminated. 
International relations are not legal at an instant and political at another, but bear the same, 
mixed taint at every instance. 
This article starts by sketching the implications of Second World War on the traditional 
European system (A) and will then address the three main areas of French foreign policy in the 
1960s (B): Political intergovernmental cooperation, supranational economic integration, and 
the nature of the transnational military and strategic partnership. 
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A. International Legal Order in the 1950s and 1960s 
For European states, the end of the Second World War had fundamentally changed the arena. 
Whereas European powers could delineate their major international relations in ‘classic’ 
European diplomatic schemes within the border of the continent or their overseas acquisitions, 
the international system had decisively developed into a global one. Europe was but one of the 
international theatres for global powers. Moreover, the USSR and the United States, who 
emerged as the strongest forces after the Second World War, had strategic interests on the 
continent, but were not part of Western Europe. Decision centres had moved away from Paris, 
London, Vienna or Berlin to Washington and Moscow. Consequently, agreements on armament 
reductions or nuclear non-proliferation were decided by the two superpowers, and were a sign 
that the other sovereign nations were out of the game. France1 or China2, permanent members 
of the 1945 big power club, did not accept this. The Federal Republic of Germany, on the other 
hand, could not afford to oppose such a text, and had to accede to the instrument (17 August 
1965). 
Consequently, European nations as France, Britain or Germany, in full disarray after the 
destruction and exhaustion caused by the war, had to reconstruct their international and legal 
discourse from a position hitherto unknown to them, that of second-rank powers3. The European 
management system of international affairs seemed to have utterly failed, perceived as the result 
                                                 
1 E.g. France’s decision to stay away from the disarmament talks in Geneva (De Gaulle, press conference 
15 May 1962: “nous ne voyons donc pas de raison pour grossir l'aéropage qui s'y trouve, qui entend exposer des 
plans inconciliables et ne peut rien faire que gémir comme le choeur des vieillards dans la tragédie antique: 
'Inextricable difficulté ! Comment en sortir ?”, quoted by D. COLARD & J.-F. GUILHAUDIS, De Gaulle et le 
désarmement, in: INSTITUT CHARLES DE GAULLE (Hg.), De Gaulle en son siècle; T. 4: La sécurité et 
l'indépendance de la France, Paris 1991, S. 112), or the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Couve de Murville to diverse 
French diplomatic agents abroad, Paris, 3 February 1967, DDF 1967, No. 62, 207). DDF = Documents 
Diplomatiques Français, Paris 2004-… 
2 E.g. Open-air nuclear test ban treaty between the United States, Great Britain and the USSR, Moscow, 
5 August 1963, 480 UNTS 43 (See Memorandum by Meyer-Lindenberg on the registration of the treaty with the 
UN, 16 October 1963, AAPD, 1963-III, No. 391). A year later (16 October 1964), the People’s Republic of China 
brought its first nuclear bomb to explosion. On 5 September 1966, France announced its first successful nuclear 
test at Mururoa. On the implications of the NTBT, see A. PEYREFITTE, C’était de Gaulle, Paris 2000, S. II, 29-
31; M.-F. FURET, La non proliferation des armes nucléaires, in: Revue générale de droit international public 
LXXI (1967), S. 1009-1046. AAPD = Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Oldenbourg 
1997-… 
3 S. HOFFMANN, Gulliver’s Troubles, or the setting of American policy, New York 1968. 
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of centuries of war, occasionally interrupted by balance-of-power diplomacy4, or channelled 
into colonial expansion5. Public opinion was more and more averse to military confrontation6 
and the former European possessions or protectorates on other continents made an appeal to 
popular sovereignty and self-determination. Moreover, as the Cold War set in from 1947 on, 
Europe was divided according to the lines of occupation at the end of the Second World War. 
International organisations around the two antagonist superpowers followed. The continent’s 
security was thus divided between associations of states anchored across the Atlantic, or behind 
the Iron Curtain.  
In general internationalist doctrine, the end of the Second World War sounded as a unique 
opportunity for the theories of Georges Scelle7, Hersch Lauterpacht8 or Hans Kelsen9, who 
                                                 
4 M. VEC, From the Congress of Vienna to the Paris Peace Treaties of 1919, in: B. FASSBENDER & A. 
PETERS (Hg.), Oxford Handbook on the History of International Law, Oxford 2012, S. 655-678. 
5 E.g. G. CLEMENCEAU, La politique coloniale: Clémenceau contre Ferry: discours prononcés à la 
Chambre des députés en juillet 1885 Paris 2012; R. TOMBS & M. VAÏSSE (Hg.), L’histoire coloniale en débat 
en France et en Grande-Bretagne (Histoire), Bruxelles 2010, S.  For the legal implications of Western 19th century 
colonialism, see A. ANGHIE, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (Cambridge Studies 
in International and Comparative Law), Cambridge 2004; M. CRAVEN, Colonialism and Domination, in: B. 
FASSBENDER & A. PETERS (Hg.), Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, Oxford 2012, S. 862-
889. 
6 J.J. SHEEHAN, Where have all the soldiers gone ? The transformation of modern Europe, Boston 2008.  
7 F. COUVEINHES, Georges Scelle, les ambiguïtés d'une pensée prémonitoire, in: Revue d'histoire des 
facultés de droit et de la science juridique (2005-2006), S. 339-406; A. WÜST, Das völkerrechtliche Werk von 
Georges Scelle im Frankreich der Zwischenkriegszeit. (Studien zur Geschichte des Völkerrechts; 13), Baden 2007. 
8 P.C. JESSUP & R.R. BAXTER, The Contribution of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht to the Development of 
International Law, in: American Journal of International Law LV (1961), S. 97-103; H. LAUTERPACHT, The 
Function of Law in the International Community, Oxford 2011 [1933]; M. KOSKENNIEMI, The gentle civilizer 
of nations : the rise and fall of international law, 1870-1960 (Hersch Lauterpacht memorial lectures), Cambridge 
2001, S.353-412. 
9 H. KELSEN, The Essence of International Law, in: K.W. DEUTSCH & S. HOFFMANN (Hg.), The 
Relevance of International Law, Cambridge (Mass.) 1971, S. 85-92; H. KELSEN, Théorie du droit international 
public, in: Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de droit international de La Haye LXXXIV (1953), S. 1-204; J. 
KAMMERHOFER, Hans Kelsen's place in international legal theory, in: A. ORAKHELASHVILI (Hg.), Research 
Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law, Cheltenham 2011, S. 143-167;  J. VON 
BERNSTORFF, Der Glaube an das universale Recht. Zur Völkerrechtstheorie Hans Kelsens und seiner Schüler, 
Baden 2001.  
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advocated the reining in of traditional sovereignty to the benefit of international community10. 
However, a full integration of the national and international legal orders, and the development 
of supranational institutions, capable to ensure legal protection to the individual11, was limited 
to the European continent only. At the level of world politics, realism in political science could 
go together with a realist approach to international law12. To paraphrase Antonio Truyol y 
Serra’s course at the Hague Academy in the late 1950s, a sociologist could treat the international 
system in terms of a society. International community, however, was reserved to the prophet13. 
Section 1: A Bipolar World Order 
“Ce machin qu’on appelle l’ONU” 
Charles de Gaulle, 10 September 196014 
                                                 
10 M. LEFEBVRE, Le jeu du droit et de la puissance. Précis de relations internationales (Collection 
Major), Paris 2000, S.22, A. TRUYOL Y SERRA, Genèse et structure de la société internationale, in: Recueil des 
cours de l'Académie de droit international de La Haye XLVI (1959), S. 553-642, hier 574. 
11 H. LAUTERPACHT, International law and human rights London 1950; R. KOLB, The Protection of 
the Individual in times of War and Peace, in: B. FASSBENDER & S. PETER (Hg.), Oxford Handbook of the 
History of International Law, Oxford 2012, S. 319; R. TEITEL, Humanity's law, Oxford 2011. 
12 O. JÜTERSONKE, Morgenthau, Law and Realism Cambridge 2010, .; H.J. MORGENTHAU, La 
Réalité des normes, en particulier des normes du droit international. Fondements d'une théorie des normes, par 
Hans Morgenthau, Paris 1934; H.J. MORGENTHAU, Macht und Frieden. Grundlegung einer Theorie der 
internationalen Politik (Krieg und Frieden. Beiträge zu Grundproblemen der internationalen Politik), Gütersloh 
1963. 
13 TRUYOL Y SERRA, Genèse et structure de la société internationale, S. 574. The present contribution 
leaves aside the rule of law and domestic constitutional law, including fundamental rights and legal protection (R. 
WAHL, Herausforderungen und Antworten: Das Öffentliche Recht der letzten fünf Jahrzehnte (Schriftenreihe der 
Juristischen Gesellschaft zu Berlin; 178), Berlin 2006, 14-15), and is solely concerned with horizontal legal 
discourse between states. For a history of German legal culture in public law and state theory, I refer to M. 
STOLLEIS, Dans le ventre de Léviathan. La science du droit constitutionnel sous le national-socialisme, in: 
Astérion. Philosophie, histoire des idées, pensée politique 2006 (4), S. 99-122; Geschichte des öffentlichen  Rechts, 
III: Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht in Republik und Diktatur: 1914-1945, München 1999.  
14 Quoted in J. LACOUTURE, De Gaulle, t. 1: le rebelle, Paris 1984, S.110. 
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I. Leviathan tamed ? The UN System  
The political divide in the post 1945 world, which was gradually installed from about 1947 
on15, was posterior to the installation of universal international organisations, mostly the United 
Nations and its sister organisations. The principles governing the functioning of these bodies 
required a high degree of abstraction, a corollary of the need for general consent16. The United 
Nations security system was designed to freeze and protect the big powers’ interests. 
Consequently, the emphasis on sovereignty, equality and state consent, three cardinal factors in 
the classical European law of nations, was preponderant17. At the same time, this reinforced 
and consolidated secondary or small powers’ rights as sovereign states18. 
If any development drew a strict line between the early modern state system  and the post 1945-
era, it was the outlawing of war in art. 2 (4) UN Charter19, according to which the “Members 
of the Organisation shall refrain, in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
                                                 
15 M. VAÏSSE, La Paix au XXe siècle (Belin Sup. Histoire; CAPES, agrégation), Paris 2004, S.220; J.L. 
GADDIS, The Cold War London 2007; Y. VANDENBERGHE, De koude oorlog: een nieuwe geschiedenis (1917-
1991) Leuven 2008. 
16 G. HÖHNE & H. ROSE, Handbuch der internationalen Organisationen, Berlin 1969, S.18: the Soviet 
Union declared in 1922 (under Lenin), to be prepared to accede to international organizations at three conditions: 
participation of all dependent or colonial peoples, non-interference in internal affairs by the organization and, 
lastly, development aid for less developed peoples. This point of view should be seen in the light of Lenin’s 
aspiration to set the USSR as a revolutionary power with worldwide appeal to Western colonies (L. MÄLKSOO, 
International law between universality and regional fragmentation. The historical case of Russia, in: A. 
ORAKHELASHVILI (Hg.), Research Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law, Cheltenham 
2011, S. 474). 
17 E.g. HÖHNE & ROSE, Handbuch der internationalen Organisationen (Anm. 16), S.487-488, who 
qualified the North Atlantic Treaty creating NATO (o.c.), founded with the mission “das militärische und 
ökonomische Potential der imperialistischen Staaten unter Führung der USA zusammenzufassen und zu 
vergrößern, um die Herrschaft des Monopolkapitals über die Erde zu erhalten“ as a violation of the UN collective 
security system. NATO’s proselytism to spread “Imperialistic” world order was contrasted with the Warsaw Pact’s 
preamble, appealing to all nations, irrespective of their internal order. 
18 HOFFMANN, Gulliver’s Troubles, or the setting of American policy (Anm. 3), S.35. In the same sense: 
LEFEBVRE, Le jeu du droit et de la puissance. Précis de relations internationales (Anm. 10), S.33. 
19 W. MICHAEL REISMAN, Coercion and Self-Determination. Construing Article 2 (4)”; in: American 
Journal of International Law LXXVIII (1984), S. 642-645;T. RUYS, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN 




against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state20”. This prohibition on the 
use of force in the settlement of disputes, declared a rule of customary international law by the 
ICJ in the Nicaragua-case (198621), seemed the achievement of attempts to achieve “peace 
through law”, celebrating the achievements of the process of juridification in a state of “law 
through peace22”. The UN Charter restricted the right of any sovereign state to solve quarrels 
“par une bonne guerre” to the case of self-defence (art. 51 UN Charter23).  
Sanctions for transgressors of this rule, however, were still as limited as in the 18th century24. 
The Security Council, composed of five permanent members, could patrol the world, but only 
in case of unanimity between these very members who were all parties to the Cold War. From 
the Korea War on, the UN Security System was in temporary deadlock and paralysis,  due to 
the USSR’s systematic abstention from the Security Council25.  
II. Bipolar confrontation 
As the Cold War set in, both the United States and the USSR built up international organisations 
corresponding to their ideological and geopolitical power ambitions26. The USSR argued from 
                                                 
20  Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 26 June 1945. Coordinated version 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/; C. EAGLETON, The United Nations: Aims and Structure, in: Yale Law 
Journal LV (Aug. 1946), S. 974-996. 
21 Case concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua/U.S.), 27 June 
1986, ICJ Reports 1986, 14. 
22 P.W. KAHN, Imagining Warfare, in: European Journal of International Law XXIV (2013), S. 199-226, 
hier 207-208: “Legal academics, in particular, read the movement [208] from the League to the Charter to the 
International Criminal Court as a single story of the progressive realization of a global legal order in which the 
idea of the enemy who is not a criminal ultimately has no place.”. 
23 Ibid., S. 210: “Self-defence is not about justice, but about protecting the political space of sovereignty”. 
24  R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, Over koningen en bureaucraten: oorsprong en ontwikkeling van de 
hedendaagse staatsinstellingen (Elseviers historische bibliotheek), Amsterdam 1977, S.44-45. 
25 C. FOCARELLI, International law in the 20th Century, in: A. ORAKHELASHVILI (Hg.), Research 
Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law, Cheltenham 2011, S. 504; J. WEILER & A. 
DESHMAN, Far be it from Thee to Slay the Rigtheous with the Wicked: An Historial and Historiographical Sketch 
of the Bellicose Debate Concerning the Distinction between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, in: European Journal 
of International Law XXIV (2013), S. 25-62, hier 35-38. 
26 HÖHNE & ROSE, Handbuch der internationalen Organisationen (Anm. 16), S.16-17, printed in the 
German Democratic Republic, on international organisations, classifying “socialist” and “imperialistic” IO’s 
(NATO/EEC), versus general IO’s, seen as neutral arena’s: “Die sozialistischen Organisationen […] So wurde das 
militärpolitische Bündnis, der Warschauer Vertrag, als Reaktion auf den Beitritt des aggressivsten europäischen 
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a strict theory of sovereignty and non-intervention. The UN system was seen as legitimate, since 
it represented all states on an equal basis. Yet, at a regional level, international organisations 
were classified as either socialist or Imperialistic, and seen as vehicles in an ideological battle. 
As the Cold War became hot in Latin-America or Asia, Soviet doctrine condemned US 
intervention. However, the general customary principle of non-intervention did not apply in 
Eastern Europe, where the USSR crushed dissidence in Hungary (1956) or Czechoslovakia 
(1968), thanks to a supposed regional custom permitting intervention whereas it had been 
outlawed for the rest of the world, as an application of the lex specialis-principle27. 
The nuclear stalemate inherent to the armament of the two big powers, paradoxically, reinforced 
the protection of minor powers. If an attack means total destruction, any armed attack becomes 
                                                 
Staates – der westdeutsche Bundesrepublik- zur NATO geschaffen  […] der Rat für Gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe 
(RGW)  […] stellt das für die weitere Entwicklung der sozialistischen Arbeitsteilung und Kooperation notwendige 
Kollektivorgan dar, ohne das eine allseitige Entwicklung der einzelnen sozialistischen Länder nicht mehr denkbar 
ist. […] [17] Die imperialistischen Organisationen wurden gebildet, um das imperialistische System unter Führung 
der USA zu organisieren und weil die UNO trotz der dort zeitweilig funktionierenden USA-
Abstimmungsmaschine nicht in dem gewünschten Masse für die Interessen der stärksten imperialistischen Mächte 
eingespannt werden konnte. Es wird kein Hehl daraus gemacht, dass im Rahmen der imperialistischen Pakte die 
Souveränität der einzelnen Staaten nicht nur faktisch eingeschränkt, sondern auch juristisch zugunsten der 
Monopolbourgeoisie der stärksten imperialistischen Mächte aufgehoben werden soll.“ General International 
organizations, by contrast, embodied „dass vor allem in der Hauptfrage – Krieg und Frieden- trotz der vorhanden 
staatlichen Trennung eine Gemeinschaft gegen die imperialistische Bestrebungen entstanden ist.“ Höhne and Rose 
classified „imperialist“ IO’s as given facts, but as violations of general international law (“Nicht alles, was faktisch 
existiert, existiert auch rechtmäßig, das heißt in Übereinstimmung mit dem allgemein anerkannten Völkerrecht. 
Das schließt nicht aus, dass unrechtmäßige Organisationen sich in rechtmäßige, in solche der friedlichen 
Koexistenz, verwandeln können.“, ibid., S. 20). See as well G.I. TUNKIN, Co-Existence and International Law, 
in: Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de droit international de La Haye XLV (1958), S. 1-82, who conceived of 
coexistence in international law not as coexistence between sovereigns, but between two types to organize society: 
“the Marx-Lenin theory of reconstruction of society and building a new society based on common property in the 
means of production, envisaging elimination of social classes and extinction of the State”, versus “propounding 
principles of existing capitalist society based on private property”. See as well E. MCWHINNEY, "Peaceful Co-
existence" and Soviet-Western International Law, in: American Journal of International Law LVI (1962), S. 951-
970 ; O.J. LISSITZYN, “Le droit international dans un monde divisé, in: Revue générale de droit international 
public LXIX (1965), S. 917-976. 
27 M. KOSKENNIEMI, From apology to utopia : the structure of international legal argument, Cambridge 
2005 [1989], S.447, footnote 216, G.I. TUNKIN, Theory of International Law, London 1974, S.46-47, 431. 
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highly improbable28. States with proper means of nuclear deterrence, and thus less dependent 
on the two superpowers, could therein act with relatively greater freedom. Conversely, states in 
a precarious situation, such as West Germany, closely watched the “balance of power” in 
armaments. By contrast to Old Régime or 19th century diplomacy Concert of Europe- 
diplomacy, the metaphor did not serve to elaborate a legal structure any more, but became a 
symbol for a military expenses race29. 
Section 2: Europe, or the New Diplomacy of Regional Institutions  
Due to the very (political) weakness of the Charter system, which maintained a Big Power-
management of the global equilibrium, the UN Charter left room in its article 51 for collective 
self-defence30. Thus, regional security organisations could fulfil every state’s right to defence, 
by pooling more states together in a permanent defensive alliance. For the Atlantic bloc, NATO 
became the key organisation in 194931. 
I. The consequences of the Cold War: reintroducing Germany 
The immediate aftermath of the war made a reconciliation with the wiped-out German state 
difficult. France concluded a separate alliance with Britain and the USSR32. European defence 
                                                 
28 H. MEYROWITZ, Les juristes devant l’arme nucléaire, in: Revue générale de droit international public 
LXVII (1963), S. 820-873, hier 871: “Par la nature et par le degré de ces effets, l’arme nucléaire se situe au delà 
du droit de la guerre.” HOFFMANN, Gulliver’s Troubles, or the setting of American policy (Anm. 3), S.36 
contrasts this with Thucyides’ idea on minor powers in Classical Greece: whereas the latter avoid to the maximum 
contact with big powers (Athens/Sparta), fearing for their subjection or destruction, minor powers in the Cold War 
could feel physically safer and diplomatically freer under the umbrella of a superpower. 
29 E.g. von Hase (delegate to the disarmament talks) to the Auswärtiges Amt, Geneva, AAPD 1962-I, N°. 
134, 641: “We can agree to all worldwide disarmament arrangements which take account of the principle that the 
balance of power must not be shifted to the detriment of our side.” 
30 “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence 
if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security”, art. 51, UN Charter. 
31 A. BEAUFRE, L’OTAN et l’Europe (Questions d'actualité), Paris 1966; W.E. BECKETT, The North 
Atlantic Treaty, the Brussels Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations (The Library of World Affairs; 12), 
London 1950; H. KISSINGER, The Troubled Partnership: A Re-Appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance, New York 
1965; S. ROBERT, P.-H. TEITGEN, G. BIDAULT, A. DENIS & J. DUMAS, Le Pacte Atlantique (Les documents 
parlementaires), Paris 1949; M. VAÏSSE, P. MELANDRI & F. BOZO (Hg.), La France et l'OTAN 1949-1966, 
Bruxelles 1996.  




was organized against the aggressor of the past war, as the Treaty on the Western European 
Union explicitly stated33. It took until 1949 for the NATO-treaty to be signed34.    
From the Soviet point of view, European economic integration, a sidekick of the bigger 
American Imperialistic design35 , was bound to lead to the reaffirmation of an aggressive 
economic and political revival of West Germany 36 , or merely served the monopolies of 
transnational corporations to the detriment of the working class (read: national Communist 
parties in Western Europe37). The reintroduction of German military elements in NATO, called 
for by the Americans during the Korean War, reinforced this impression: the EEC and NATO 
were two equal parts of a strategy to attack the socialist nations: West German monopolies and 
the American military had concluded an alliance38. For the Russian-led bloc, only the UN-
organs had legitimacy to act on the international stage39. 
                                                 
33  Treaty for collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for collective self-defence, 
between Belgium, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, Brussels, 17 March 1948, 19 
UNTS 53, preamble : “To take such steps as may be held to be necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of 
a policy of aggression” (our underlining). M.-T. BITSCH, Histoire de la construction européenne de 1945 à nos 
jours (Questions à l'histoire; 161), Bruxelles 2008.  
34 North Atlantic Treaty between Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, 
Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States, 
Washington, 4 April 1949, 34 UNTS 243. 
35 HÖHNE & ROSE, Handbuch der internationalen Organisationen (Anm. 16), S.489. On the political 
pressure exerted by US Congress for the award of the Marshall Plan funds, see P. MELANDRI, Les Etats-Unis 
face à l’unification de l’Europe, 1945-1954 (Publications de la Sorbonne; Série internationale; 11), Paris 1980, 
S.8. 
36 HÖHNE & ROSE, Handbuch der internationalen Organisationen (Anm. 16), S.482-483. See as well 
A. GRACHEV, The Soviet Leadership’s View of Western European Integration in the 1950s and 1960s, in: A. 
DEIGHTON (Hg.), Widening, Deepening and Acceleration Baden-Baden 1999, S. 31-40. 
37 GRACHEV, The Soviet Leadership’s View of Western European Integration in the 1950s and 1960s 
(Anm. 36),  S. 36. 
38 Pravda, 17 March 1957, cited in ibid., S. 37. 
39 E.g. Krutchev’s November 1962 proposal to place the allied troops in West-Berlin under UN-flag. The 
allies refused to transfer the authority over their troops to the UN Security Council, since this would mean 
abandoning the occupation regime for Germany, while a definitive peace treaty to end World War II had not been 
signed (Memorandum by ambassador Ritter, 17 November 1962, AAPD 1962-III, nr. 453, 1950-1951). 
Furthermore, France feared that the UN General Assembly might get involved with the matter, on the basis of the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution, which opened the door to the Assembly to take over the management of the Korea 
War in absence of the USSR as a permanent member (FOCARELLI, International law in the 20th Century,  S. 
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From the legal point of view, the statute of Germany was a cumbersome affair. Defeated on 8 
may 1945, its sovereignty was not restored until the German unification took force on 15 March 
1991. Neither the Federal Republic in the West nor the Democratic Republic in the East40 were 
sovereign states41. The partitioned former Third Reich capital Berlin, under a four party-regime 
of the former wartime allies, or the modification of the Eastern border to compensate Poland (a 
quarter of pre-wartime German national territory42) could count as symbols of this uneasy 
situation. The Federal Republic claimed to represent the former German state in its 31 
December 1937 borders, well until the end of the 1960s43.  As well West as East Germany 
started from a handicapped position on the international level. Recognized and acting in 
international organisation, they were still nonetheless “non-sovereign entities”. Their decisions 
depended on the agreement of the quadripartite conglomerate of France, Britain, the USSR and 
the US. 
Bringing West Germany in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, as happened in 195444, 
implied a considerable concession. The Federal Republic had to renounce the production or use 
                                                 
502-503). The Federal Republic feared that Berlin would become subject of a “floating vote” within the General 
Assembly (Ritter, 17 November 1962, 1954). 
40 C. WENKEL, Auf der Suche nach einem anderen Deutschland: das Verhältnis Frankreichs zur DDR 
im Spannungsfeld von Perzeption und Diplomatie (diss.doc.) Paris 2008; M. VAÏSSE & C. WENKEL, La 
Diplomatie française face à l’unification allemande, d’après des archives inédites (Histoires d'Aujourd'hui), Paris 
2011.  
41 I. COUZIGOU, L’évolution du statut international de l’Allemagne depuis 1945 (Collection de droit 
international; 66), Bruxelles 2011; H.-J. KÜSTERS, Der Integrationsfriede : Viermächte-Verhandlungen über die 
Friedensregelung mit Deutschland, 1945-1990 (Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik. Studien ; 9), München 2000. 
42 COUZIGOU, L’évolution du statut international de l’Allemagne depuis 1945 (Anm. 41), S.19-20 ; 
KISSINGER, The Troubled Partnership: A Re-Appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (Anm. 31), S.219. 
43 COUZIGOU, L’évolution du statut international de l’Allemagne depuis 1945 (Anm. 41), S.22 ; see 
Memorandum, Blankenhorn (German ambassador to Paris), Paris, 21 October 1963, AAPD 1963-III, No. 395, 
1346), regretting the French refusal to alter its point of view concerning the Oder-Neisse-border: for France, 
relations with “den freiheitlich gesinnten Polen, die mit Deutschland die Herstellung freiheitlicher Verhältnisse in 
ganz Osteuropa ersehnten” were needlessly hampered by German territorial stubbornness. Herbert Blankenhorn 
(1904-1991) was ambassador in Paris from 1958 to 1963. H. BLANKENHORN, Verständnis und Verständigung. 
Blätter eines politischen Tagebuchs 1949 bis 1979 Frankfurt-am-Main 1980; B. RAMSCHEID, Herbert 
Blankenhorn (1904-1991). Adenauers aussenpolitischer Berater (Forschungen und Quellen zur Zeitgeschichte; 
49), Düsseldorf 2006.  
44 Convention between the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, Paris, 23 October 1954, 332 UNTS 3. 
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of atomic, biological or chemical weapons45. There again, even if the financial or industrial 
capabilities would have been present, Germany would have to fight a diplomatic battle without 
end to build nuclear weapons itself, as Britain and France could do freely. Moreover, West 
German diplomacy had to get its international partners to abstain from any recognition of the 
DDR. The so-called Hallstein-doctrine implied that West Germany posed the non-recognition 
of East Germany as a precondition in diplomatic affairs46. 
II. “Entrepreneurs of Europe47” and traditional legal science 
“Tandis que les hommes d’État débattent, sans ménager le poids 
de leur autorité et la fougue de leurs convictions […] les juristes 
[…] s’emploient à la naissance, discrète mais lourde de 
promesses, d’un droit européen.” 
Michel Gaudet, 196348 
“Rien n’est possible sans les hommes, rien n’est durable sans les 
institutions.” 
                                                 
45  Unilateral Declaration by Konrad Adenauer, London, 3 October 1954, inserted into the WEU’s 
Protocol III concerning armament controls: “the Federal Republic of Germany has engaged itself not to produce 
on its territory any atomic, biological or chemical weapons.” Only a decision of the WEU’s council, on a proposal 
submitted by the SACEUR (NATO supreme commander in Europe) and the FRG government, can authorize a 
partial or total revision of this regime. By its accession to NATO, the Federal Republic of Germany acceded to the 
Western European Union, created by the Treaty between Belgium, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, for collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters, 
and for collective self-defence, Brussels, 17 March 1948, UNTS 19 (1948), I, nr. 304. 
46 Which could lead to a certain degree of paranoia, e.g. Carstens’s comments on the instructions of the 
American ambassador to the USSR: “Im sechsten Satz könne die ausdrückliche Hervorhebung, dass die USA 
keine formelle De-jure- oder De-facto-Anerkennung gewähren können, den Eindruck erwecken, als ob sie eine 
implizierte De-jure- oder De-facto-Anerkennung für möglich hielten.“ (Carstens to German Embassy in 
Washington, 9 January 1962, geheim, AAPD 1962, I, nr. 13, 14). (our underlining). On the doctrine’s legal 
foundations, see G. CORTESE & R. PAPINI, De la doctrine Hallstein à la 'Ostpolitik', in: Revue générale de droit 
international public LXXIII (1969), S. 124-132. 
47  A. VAUCHEZ, L’Union par le droit : L’invention d’un programme institutionnel pour l’Europe 
(Références), Paris 2013, S.43. See as well M. SEGERS & M. KOHNSTAMM, Diep Spel. De Europese 
dagboeken van Max Kohnstamm, september 1957-februari 1963, Amsterdam 2011. 
48 M. GAUDET, Incidences des Communautés européennes sur le droit interne des États membres, in: 
Annales de la Faculté de droit de Liège I (1963), S. 5-26. 
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Jean Monnet, Mémoires49 
Although it might seem tempting to interpret the legal history of European integration with 
hindsight, the emergence of a legal discourse advocating a separate legal order was far from 
evident to the majority of European continental jurists. Resistance to the theory of 
supranationalism came both from national public law 50  and public international law. 
Mainstream internationalist doctrine continued in line with the post-World War I consensus, 
emphasizing consensualism (as expressed in the PCIJ’s Lotus case (192751) and –thus- the 
precarious legal personality of any institution built on agreement between states 52 . State 
sovereignty was unlimited, save for explicit limitations agreed to by the states themselves53. 
Looked at from a distance of half a century, the emergence of key concepts as primacy or direct 
effect of European law seems evident54. Yet, the opposition we will describe in the next part 
(B) between the French political discourse, on one hand, and the vertical integration of the 
Atlantic world, on the other hand, was not merely one between politics and the legal 
professions55.  
                                                 
49 J. MONNET, Mémoires Paris 1976, S.447; J.-B. DUROSELLE, Deux types de grands hommes : le 
général de Gaulle et Jean Monnet, in: J.-B. DUROSELLE (Hg.), Itinéraires. Idées, hommes et nations d’Occident 
(XIXe-XXe siècles) Paris 1991, S. 243-260 ; Y. KIM, Identité et conscience européenne à travers les relations de 
Jean Monnet et de l’élite américaine 1938-1963 (diss. doc.) Cergy-Pontoise 2011. 
50 E.g. the constant minorisation of future EEC Commission president Walter Hallstein at the annual 
conferences of the Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer during the 1950s (VAUCHEZ, L’Union par le 
droit : L’invention d’un programme institutionnel pour l’Europe (Anm. 47), S.125) and the discussion leading to 
the  Solange-decisions in Karlsruhe (M. MARESCAU, De directe werking van het Europese Gemeenschapsrecht 
([Europese monografieën; 24), Antwerpen 1978, S. 202; WAHL, Herausforderungen und Antworten: Das 
Öffentliche Recht der letzten fünf Jahrzehnte, 100: „[es ist klar], daß ein Vorrang logisch und sachlich nicht ohne 
Nachrang möglich ist“). 
51 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A), No. 10 (Sept. 7). 
52 KOSKENNIEMI, From apology to utopia : the structure of international legal argument (Anm. 27), S. 
138 ; VAUCHEZ, L’Union par le droit : L’invention d’un programme institutionnel pour l’Europe (Anm. 47), S. 
123. 
53 KOSKENNIEMI, From apology to utopia : the structure of international legal argument (Anm. 27), 
S.221: “The essence of the law is to establish duties as exceptions to the initial liberty”. 
54 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen  [1963] ECR 1; Case 6/64 
Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
55 E.g. the choice of the term “Communities”, explained by Paul Reuter, legal adviser in the French 
Foreign Affairs Ministry, motivated as follows: “juridiquement –en dehors du marriage et des congrégations- [ce 
terme] ne veut strictement rien dire”. Precisely this quality allowed to create a legal newspeak within public 
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 Instead, both a “weak” and a “strong” programme on the Rome Treaties lived in 
academia56. The former saw the treaties creating three European communities as a coincidental 
whole of four separate international instruments, organising coexistence between states57. The 
Commissions’ legal services, backed by business lawyers acting for (mainly American) 
multinational corporations58, advocated that the treaties formed a constitutional bloc, installing 
a hierarchy between two separate legal orders, the national and the supranational. The 
traditional internationalist conception saw European community law as a political law, whereby 
political agreements between equal and sovereign partners continued as the sole source of law. 
Yet, Institutional59 discourse, produced by the organs created by the treaties, saw the judge, and 
in the case of competition, the administration, as law creators themselves. This, in turn, had as 
a consequence that transnational economic activity would create an ever closer union de facto, 
whereas the traditional conception saw this as the mission of politicians and high government 
officials within each state. Finally, unification through the renvoi-procedure of art. 177 EEC 
allowed to bypass intergovernmental and national political procedures to let European law 
prevail in concrete cases60. In other words, the European jurist’s interpretative habitus would 
be shaped in Brussels and Luxemburg61, away from the legicentrism of the national legal order, 
where top-down law-making prevailed62.  
                                                 
international law, whereby “politics precedes political theory, as language precedes grammar” (W. HALLSTEIN, 
United Europe: challenge and opportunity (William L. Clayton lectures on international economic affairs and 
foreign policy; 5), Cambridge (Mass.) 1962, S. 29). 
56 The terms are those of VAUCHEZ, L’Union par le droit : L’invention d’un programme institutionnel 
pour l’Europe (Anm. 47), S. 215. 
57 E.g. H.J. SCHLOCHAUER, Das Verhältnis des Rechts der Europäischen Wirtschaftgemeinschaft zu 
den nationalen Rechtsordnungen der Mitgliedstaaten, in: Archiv des Völkerrechts XI (1963), S. 2-34, hier 7-8. See 
as well H. STEIGER, Die Unabhängigkeit der Rechtssetzung der europäischen Gemeinschaften, Köln 1964; H. 
STEIGER, Staatlichkeit und Überstaatlichkeit : eine Untersuchung zur rechtlichen und politischen Stellung der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Schriften zum öffentlichen Recht; 31), Berlin 1966. 
58 VAUCHEZ, L’Union par le droit : L’invention d’un programme institutionnel pour l’Europe (Anm. 
47), S. 95-113 (La « place de Bruxelles »).  
59 “un système d’ « Institutions » avec le « i » majuscule” ibid., S. 61. 
60 L. WINKEL, Preliminary ruling of the European Court of Justice and their precursors, in : Tijdschrift 
voor Rechtsgeschiedenis / Revue d’Histoire du Droit / The Legal History Review LXXV (2007), S. 231-237.  
61 VAUCHEZ, L’Union par le droit : L’invention d’un programme institutionnel pour l’Europe (Anm. 
47), S.177. 
62 Ibid. S. 152. 
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 During the critical formation years in the 1950s, the legal advisors at the Auswärtiges Amt 
in Bonn63 had strong ties with future commission president Walter Hallstein, who taught at the 
University of Frankfurt: the legal historian and diplomat Wilhelm Grewe (1911-200064), future 
secretary of state and Federal President Karl Carstens (1914-1992, also professor at the 
University of Cologne 65 ), Carl Friedrich Ophüls (1895-1970, diplomat and professor of 
international law at Frankfurt66), Ernst Steindorff (°1920, Hallstein’s former assistant, and 
professor at the University of Munich67) and Hermann Mosler (1924-2001, professor at the 
University of Frankfurt and director of the Max Planck Institute for International Law and 
Comparative Public Law, future ECHR and ICJ judge68). From the French side, the Quai 
d’Orsay and traditional high administration provided the ECSC and EEC with its finest civil 
servants: Emile Noël (1922-1996), former chief of cabinet to Prime Minister Guy Mollet (1905-
1975), as Secretary-General of the Commission or Michel Gaudet (1915-2003), head of first 
the ECSC and then the EEC’s legal service (whose numbers rose from 12 to 80 in the sixties69). 
                                                 
63 C. HIEPEL, Le ministère ouest-allemand des Affaires étrangères et l’intégration européenne, des 
origines à 1974, in : L. BADEL, S. JEANNESON & N. PIERS LUDLOW (Hg.), Les administrations nationales 
et la construction européenne : une approche historique (1919-1975) Bruxelles 2005, S. 239-258. 
64 W.G. GREWE, The role of international law in diplomatic practice, in: Journal of the History of 
International Law - Revue d'histoire du droit international I (1999), S. 22-37. 
65  K. CARSTENS, Das Recht des Europarats, Berlin 1956; K. CARSTENS, K.V. JENA & R. 
SCHMOECKEL, Erinnerungen und Erfahrungen (Schriften des Bundesarchivs), Boppard am Rhein 1993; K. 
SZATKOWSKI, Karl Carstens. Eine politische Biographie Köln 2007.  
66 Former ambassador to Belgium (1955-1958) and permanent representative to the EEC and Euratom 
(1958-1960), see W. HALLSTEIN (Hg.), Festschrift für Carl Friedrich Ophüls aus Anlass seines siebzigsten 
Geburtstages Karlsruhe 1965. 
67 E. STEINDORFF, Rechtsschutz und Verfahren im Recht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften Baden 
Baden 1964. 
68 VAUCHEZ, L'Union par le droit : L'invention d'un programme institutionnel pour l'Europe, S.49-51; 
H. MOSLER, Die Intervention im Völkerrech Berlin 1937 ; H. MOSLER, Geschichte des Max-Planck-Instituts 
für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, in: Jahrbuch der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung 
der Wissenschaften (1961), S. 687-703. 
69 G. BOSSUAT, La culture de l’unité européenne des élites françaises aux Communautés européennes, 
in: A. VARSORI (Hg.), Inside the  European Community : actors and policies in the European Integration 1957-
1972 (Veröffentlichungen der Historiker-Verbindungsgruppe bei der Kommission der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften; 9),Baden-Baden 2006, S. 67. 
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Not surprisingly, the European institutions’ working languages were French –predominantly- 
and German70. 
The following part, which deals with de Gaulle’s opposition to the ongoing enterprise of 
unification through law, shows the resilience of the alternative narrative. Traditionally, 
normative indeterminacy (or: the vagueness of treaty clauses agreed between states) provided 
diplomats and their legal advisers with a mandate to elaborate a hybrid politico-legal discourse. 
The European integration process, however, delegated this function to the court71. 
B. L’embêteuse du monde : contesting American hegemony 
“Nous ne voyons pas d'inconvénient à votre 
puissance, car  sans  elle, nous serions exposés à une 
hégémonie irrésistible  des  États-Unis. De  même  
nous  ne  voyons pas d'inconvénient à  la puissance 
des États-Unis, sans laquelle nous serions 
probablement exposés à l'hégémonie soviétique.” 
 
Conversation de Gaulle-Breznjev, 21 juin 196672 
 
“Nous ne voulons pas d’intégration militaire, 
politique, économique, monétaire, avec les 
Américains, quoique nous voulions rester leurs 
amis.” 
                                                 
70 Belgium’s impact (“Les Flamingants”) on the diminishing influence of French in the EEC was resented 
by high French civil servants (Bossuat, “La culture de l’unité européenne”, 68, quoting Jean-François Deniau: “Le 
Néerlandais Joseph Luns [Minister for Foreign Affairs] s’eprimait en français, or les Belges en raison de leurs 
querelles linguistiques ont exigé de ne pas privilégier le français. Carli le president de la Banque d’Italie parlait le 
français”. See as well F. BONN, Les problèmes juridico-linguistiques dans les Communautés Européennes, in: 
Revue générale de droit international public LXVIII (1964), S. 708-718. More generally, on language and cultural 
practices in diplomacy, C. COGAN, French negotiating behavior : dealing with La grande nation (Cross-Cultural 
Negotiation Books), Washington 2003; W.R. SMYSER, How Germans negotiate : logical goals, practical 
solutions Washington 2002. 
71 A. STONE SWEET, The judicial construction of Europe Oxford 2004, S.15. 
72 Moscow, 21 June 1966, AMAE, Entretiens & Messages, quoted in M. VAÏSSE, La Grandeur. Politique 




Conversation de Gaulle-Kiesinger, 14  January 
196773 
 
Initially, at the end of the War, France concluded a bilateral alliance with the Soviet Union74, 
in order to balance the combination between Britain and the United States, and to acquire a 
more independent standing. De Gaulle explained this as “un impératif catégorique de la 
géographie, de l’expérience et du bon sens75”, reminiscent of 18th or 19th century Franco-
Russian diplomacy. 
Yet, in the 1950s, the Fourth Republic cooperated in the demilitarisation (= end of the 
military occupation in the French, British and American zones in West Germany), coupled with 
the insertion of the Federal Republic into NATO. This rendered France  suspect in the eyes of 
Stalin and Vyshinsky76.  At the regional level, the 1962 Fouchet Plan77 was seen as “directed 
against the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist camp78”, just as the creation of a joint 
European (EEC + EFTA) or Trans-Atlantic (GATT 79) market was a threat to the Soviet 
economy80. Dominated by security matters, the USSR’s interpretation of the EEC did not go 
further than statements on the organisation as “an instrument of the Cold War and the Holy 
                                                 
73 Paris, 14 January  1967, DDF 1967, No. 23, 84. 
74 Maluinsky, member of the Commission for the Preparation of the Peace Treaties and the Postwar 
Settlement, 25 March 1944 “We are interested in the existence of a France that would be sufficiently strong in 
order not to become secondary to Britain, but not strong enough to turn against us.” (quoted in GRACHEV, The 
Soviet Leadership’s View of Western European Integration in the 1950s and 1960s (Anm. 36),  S. 34). M. VAÏSSE 
(Hg.), De Gaulle et la Russie (CNRS Histoire), Paris 2006. 
75 C. DE GAULLE, Discours et messages. 1. Pendant la guerre: juin 1940-1946 Paris 1970, S.186 
76 GRACHEV, The Soviet Leadership’s View of Western European Integration in the 1950s and 1960s 
(Anm. 36),  S. 36. 
77 R. BLOES, Le “Plan Fouchet » et le problème de l’Europe politique (Studies in contemporary European 
issues ; 5), Bruges 1970; M. CAMPS, Die Diskussionen Über die Politische Union, in: Die Internationale Politik 
(1962), S. 111-126; G. CLEMENS, A delicate matter. Grossbritannien und die Fouchet-Verhandlungen, 1960-
1962, in: Journal of European Integration History XI (2005), S. 103-124; G.-H. SOUTOU, Le Général de Gaulle, 
le plan Fouchet et l’Europe, in: Commentaire XIII (1991), S. 757-766; J.W. VANKE, An impossible union: Dutch 
objections to the Fouchet Plan, 1959-1962, in: Cold War History II (2001), S. 95-113.  
78 Archives on Foreign Policy, Presidency of the Russian Federation, quoted in GRACHEV, The Soviet 
Leadership’s View of Western European Integration in the 1950s and 1960s (Anm. 36),  S. 38. 
79 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Geneva, 30 October 1947, 55 UNTS 187. 
80 Memorandum Legationsrat Lang, geheim, 12 January 1962, AAPD 1962-I, nr. 19, 125-134. 
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Alliance against the working class, the socialist system and the developing countries81”. Only 
in 1972 did the USSR recognize the EEC as a subject of international law. 
Whereas the American nuclear force had provided protection for Europe in the first decade of 
the Cold War, the situation had changed by the end of the 1950s82. Soviet nuclear weapons 
could attain American territory thanks to the development of long-range-bombers. The effective 
use of nuclear power thus became much less likely: “No American politician would risk the 
destruction of his own cities to stop a Soviet advance in Europe”83. Consequently, Europe had 
to turn to other solutions for an effective and certain protection. 
When Charles de Gaulle returned to power in May 195884, he was seen as a nationalist leader 
with very little regard for the new international organisation85. The failure of the  European 
Defence Community, the initiative designed to pool the standing armies of France, Britain and 
Germany into a supranational force, was attributed to his opposition86. In opposition for the 
whole of the Fourth Republic87, de Gaulle had attacked the Treaties of Rome establishing the 
                                                 
81 GRACHEV, The Soviet Leadership’s View of Western European Integration in the 1950s and 1960s,  
(Anm. 36) S. 40. 
82 W. LOTH, Franco-German Relations and European Security, 1957-1963, in: A. DEIGHTON (Hg.), 
Widening, deepening and acceleration : the European economic community 1957-1963 (Veröffentlichungen der  
Historiker-Verbindungsgruppe bei der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften; 7), Baden-Baden 1999, S. 
41. 
83 Ibid. 
84 G. ELGEY, Histoire de la IVe république. 4 : De Gaulle à Matignon Paris 2011 ; R. RÉMOND, Le 
retour de de Gaulle (Questions au 20e siècle), Bruxelles 1998. 
85 De Gaulle opposed the “alchemy” of the ECSC and castigated the European Defence Community 
(“mélange apatride”, “robot”, “monstre artificiel”, “Frankenstein”, “protectorat”) for allowing the Americans into 
French military affairs through the backdoor (VAÏSSE, La Grandeur. Politique étrangère du Général de Gaulle, 
1958-1969 (Anm. 71), S.32, D. COLLARD & G. DAILLE, Le Général de Gaulle et les alliances, in: INSTITUT 
CHARLES DE GAULLE (Hg.), De Gaulle en son siècle; T. 4: La sécurité et l'indépendance de la France, Paris 
1992, S. 67; J. PINDER, Europe against de Gaulle (Federal trust for education and research. Publications), London 
1963). 
86 P. BUTON, La CED, l’affaire Dreyfus de la Quatrième République ?, in: Vingtième Siècle (2004), S. 
43-59; on the legal debate in France, see J.-M. MILLET, Les publicistes français et la CED, controverse doctrinale 
et engagement civique, in: Relations Internationales (2012), S. 101-114. 
87  E.g. Couve de Murville’s interview on diplomatic service at the Quai d’Orsay under the Fourth 
Republic (expressing a point of view close to that of de Gaulle): “ces gouvernements faisaient ce que je me 
permettrais d'appeler des âneries. Ils suivaient les Américains les yeux fermés et, lorsqu'il y avait un incident ils 
faisaient n'importe quoi” (S. MAFFERT & M. VAÏSSE, Entretien avec Maurice Couve de Murville, in: INSTITUT 
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EEC and Euratom, concluded in March 195788, barely a month and a half before his return to 
power. The “Adenauer-Schuman”-era, which had seen the birth of the ECSC and the integration 
of West-Germany into NATO, was closed89. Britain hoped the new French chief of government 
would renege his predecessors’ engagements in the Treaties of Rome90.  
Yet, de Gaulle’s action would turn out decisive for the consolidation of the European 
Community: “on a dit que ceux qui ont signé le traité de Rome ne l’auraient pas appliqué, et 
que le général de Gaulle ne l’aurait pas signé mais l’a mis en application91”. He saw the 
Common Market as essential to European organisation, since it allowed for the controlled 
development of West Germany92. Irrespective of the factual failure of his political designs, the 
French President obtained the supranational organization of the Common Agricultural Policy93. 
Moreover, de Gaulle, son of a history teacher, tried to link Europe’s past to a multipolar message 
for the future94. 
Simultaneously, the economic revival of Western Europe, triggered by American help, made 
France less dependent on its former colonial markets. With the other continental powers no 
                                                 
CHARLES DE GAULLE (Hg.), Gaulle en son siècle. T. 4: La sécurité et l'indépendance de la France, Paris 1992, 
S. 222). 
88  Treaty between Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxemburg and the 
Netherlands, creating the European Economic Community, Rome, 25 March 1957, 294 UNTS 3 (official text in 
French); Treaty between Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxemburg and the 
Netherlands creating the European Community for Atomic Energy (EURATOM), Rome, 25 March 1957, 294 
UNTS 259 (official text in French). 
89 Conversation Gerhard Schröder-Dean Acheson, Bonn, 19 October 1963, geheim, AAPD 1963-III, No. 
394, 1342; T. HÖRBER, The Foundations of Europe: European Integration Ideas in France, Germany and Britain 
in the 1950s (Forschungen zür Europäischen Integration; 19), Wiesbaden 2006. 
90 VAÏSSE, La Grandeur. Politique étrangère du Général de Gaulle, 1958-1969 (Anm. 71), S.166. 
91 E. BURIN DES ROZIERS, L'indépendance nationale selon de Gaulle: fondement et pratique d'une 
politique, in: INSTITUT CHARLES DE GAULLE (Hg.), De Gaulle en son siècle. T. 4: La sécurité et 
l'indépendance de la France, Paris 1992, S. 235. 
92 VAÏSSE, La Grandeur. Politique étrangère du Général de Gaulle, 1958-1969 (Anm. 71), S.166-167. 
93 A.-C. LAURING KUNDSEN, Creating the Common Agricultural Policy, in: W. LOTH (Hg.), Crises 
and Compromises: The European Project 1963-1969 Baden-Baden/Bruxelles 2001, S. 131-156; A. 
MORAVCSIK, Le grain et la grandeur. Les origines économiques de la politique européenne du général de Gaulle 
(1ère partie), in: Revue française de science politique XLIX (1999), S. 507-544; X (2000), No. 1, 73-124 (part II). 
94 “Histoire”, in: C. ANDRIEU, P. BRAUD & G. PIKETTY (Hg.), Dictionnaire De Gaulle (Bouquins), 
Paris 2006, S. 608-609. 
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longer as competitors, it could look for a new partnership. De Gaulle openly teased the United 
States, who had reproached France its war in Algeria. In February-March 1964, Nikolaï 
Podgorny, president of the USSR’s Soviet, visited Paris. Directly afterwards, de Gaulle went to 
Mexico (15-24 March). Half a year later, to Latin America, qualifying Fidel Castro as a Latin-
American nationalist95. In March 1965, France and the USSR agreed to jointly develop colour 
television (SECAM-standard)96. A year later, de Gaulle spent 12 days in Russia, orated before 
a million people, and installed a structural cooperation, as if the Entente Cordiale, the 19th 
century alliance behind Germany’s back, had returned97. A year and a half after the beginning 
of systematic US bombardments in the French former colony Vietnam98, de Gaulle castigated 
the aggressive policy of the hegemon in his Pnom Penh discourse (30 August 1966. The US did 
not understand that never: “les peuples de l'Asie se soumettent à la loi de l'étranger venu de 
l'autre rive du Pacifique, quelles que puissent être ses  intentions  et  si  puissantes  que  soient  
ses  armées99.” France had shrugged off its former role as colonial power100, and took the role 
of “morale Führungsmacht für die dritte Welt101”. Whereas the United States had criticized the 
                                                 
95 De Gaulle to Peyrefitte, 21 October 1964, “Si ce voyage a eu une utilité, c'est de montrer que les nations 
ne demandent qu'à s'affirmer. Elles ne seront pas toujours prêtes à abdiquer leur souveraineté aux mains des deux 
super-grands. Elles prennent conscience du fait qu'elles doivent leur résister. La Chine en est plus que convaincue. 
Le Mexique, le Brésil, l'Argentine, le Chili aussi, au fond d'eux-mêmes, même s'ils hésitent à le proclamer. C'est 
la vocation de la France d'exercer son influence pour favoriser ce mouvement. Un jour viendra où tous les pays 
hostiles à la domination des deux grands se dresseront pour défendre leur indépendance. Ce jour-là sera le nôtre” 
(PEYREFITTE, C’était de Gaulle (Anm. 2), S. II,207). 
96 O. CHANTRIAUX, Le bras de fer franco-allemand en matière de télévision en couleurs, in: Revue 
d'histoire diplomatique CXIX (2005), S. 75-92. 
97 H. CARRÈRE D'ENCAUSSE, La Russie dans la géopolitique de Charles de Gaulle, in: M. VAÏSSE 
(Hg.), De Gaulle et la Russie, Paris 2006, S. 273-293 ; Z. BIELOUSSOUVA, La visite du général de Gaulle en 
URSS en juin 1966, in: INSTITUT CHARLES DE GAULLE (Hg.), De Gaulle en son siècle; T. 4: La sécurité et 
l'indépendance de la France, Paris 1992, S. 392-401. 
98 P. ISOART, Les conflits du Vietnâm: positions juridiques des États-Unis, in: Annuaire français de droit 
international XII (1966), S. 50-88. 
99 Quoted in A. SA'ADAH, Idées simples et idées fixes: De Gaulle, les États-Unis et le Vietnam, in: 
INSTITUT CHARLES DE GAULLE (Hg.), De Gaulle en son siècle; T. 4: La sécurité et l'indépendance de la 
France, Paris 1992, S. 278, M. VAÏSSE, De Gaulle et la guerre du Vietnam: de la difficulté d'être Cassandre, in: 
C. GOSCHA & M. VAÏSSE (Hg.), La guerre du Vietnam et l'Europe Bruxelles 2003, S. 169-178. 
100 For a voice in French contemporary doctrine, see M. MOUSKHÉLY, La naissance des États en droit 
international public, in: Revue générale de droit international public LXVI (1962), S. 469-485. 
101 Memorandum Blankenhorn, 21 October 1963, o.c. (Anm. 43), 1350. 
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Anglo-French intervention in Suez or the Algerian War, de Gaulle projected the image of an 
Imperialist state on a nation confident on its historical credentials as the first post-colonial 
state102. 
Section 1: Two, Three, Six, or One ? “La Grandeur par l’Europe103” 
I. Franco-German Friendship, A New Balance for Europe104 ? 
“Le traité franco-allemand n’avait pas été conçu 
seulement pour sceller la réconciliation des deux 
peuples. Devant les réticences de nos partenaires du 
Marché commun à s’engager sur le plan politique, il 
devait servir aussi de base à une union franco-
allemande possédant ses vues, ses idées, sa 
politique.” 
Couve de Murville, 7 July 1964105 
“Les traités sont comme des jeunes filles et des roses: 
ça dure ce que ça dure. Si le traité allemand n'était pas 
appliqué, ce ne serait pas le premier dans l'Histoire.” 
                                                 
102  HOFFMANN, Gulliver’s Troubles, or the setting of American policy (Anm. 3), S.100-102. 
“L’embêteuse du monde” in the present section title, is drawn from R. DEBRAY, La France doit quitter l’OTAN. 
Lettre à Hubert Védrine, in: Le Monde Diplomatique LX (2013), S. 7; originally from a play by J. Giraudoux, 
L’impromptu de Paris (1937). 
103 S. BERSTEIN, Histoire du Gaullisme, Paris 2001, S. 306. 
104 M. COUVE DE MURVILLE, Der Sinn des deutsch-französischen Vertrages: Für ein Gleichgewicht 
in Europa, in: Der europäische Osten (Jul-Aug 1963), S. 399-403. 
105  Telegram to the French diplomatic representatives at Bonn, Rome, Brussels, EEC, The Hague, 
Luxemburg, Washington, London and New York, Paris, 7 July 1964, réservé, DDF, 1964, n° 12, 35. On Maurice 
Couve de Murville, Foreign Minister (1958-1968, the longest tenure since the Ancien Régime), Minister of Finance 
(1968) and Prime Minister (1968-1969), see M. COUVE DE MURVILLE, Une politique étrangère: 1958-1969 
Paris 1971; J.-P. DE GARATE, Couve de Murville (1907-1999) Paris 2007; M. VAÏSSE, COUVE DE 
MURVILLE Maurice, in: J.-F. SIRINELLI (Hg.), Dictionnaire historique de la vie politique française au XXe 
siècle Paris 2004, S. 279-299. 
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Charles de Gaulle to the UDR-parliamentary 
fractions, 3 July 1963106 
Having arrived in power as Prime Minister in 1958, Charles De Gaulle personally cancelled a 
trilateral agreement between France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy. The three 
countries had teamed up in 1957 to jointly produce nuclear weapons, confirmed by a 1958 co-
financing agreement on an isotope separation machine at Pierrelatte (France)107. This was hard 
to reconcile with the Federal Republic’s 1954 renunciation to ABC weapons108. Instead, De 
Gaulle offered Adenauer a separate bilateral cooperation, and, at the same time, courted 
Macmillan and Eisenhower for a tripartite directorate in NATO109. This last step meant that 
France would render the other Western European partners dependent on her, and at the same 
time obtain a joint veto with Britain on the use of American force110. Britain, in the meanwhile, 
had turned away from France, signing a bilateral agreement at the Bahamas-summit late 
1962111. 
                                                 
106 PEYREFITTE, C’était de Gaulle (Anm. 2), S. II, 231. 
107  C. BARBIER, Les négociations franco-germano-italienne, en vue de l’établissement d’une 
cooperation militaire nucléaire au cours des années 1956-1958, in: Revue d'histoire diplomatique CVI (1990), S. 
81-113; P.-M. DE LA GORCE, Charles de Gaulle. 2: 1945-1970 Paris 2008, S.459. 
108 In Adenauer’s view, the clause had been conditioned by a clausula rebus sic stantibus, which he 
interpreted in the light of the American nuclear presence to protect the FRG’s territory (LOTH, Franco-German 
Relations and European Security (Anm. 81),  1957-1963,  S. 49; Conversation Adenauer/De Gaulle, Paris, streng 
geheim, 4 July 1962, AAPD 1962-II, N°. 273, 1213;  Conversation Adenauer/De Gaulle, Paris, 21 January 1963, 
AAPA [Auswärtiges Amt Berlin, Politisches Archiv], B21, v. 2, 3.). M.-F. FURET, La République Fédérale 
d’Allemagne et les armements nucléaires, in: Revue générale de droit international public LXXIV (1970), S. 314-
356. 
109  Memorandum Wertz, 13 February 1962, geheim, AAPD 1962-I, N°. 69, 355-357 (Dreier-
Direktorium). A. LOCHER & C. NUENLIST, NATO Strategies toward de Gaulle’s France, 1958-1966: Learning 
to Cope, in: C. NUENLIST, A. LOCHER & G. MARTIN (Hg.), Globalizing de Gaulle : international perspectives 
on French  foreign  policies,  1958-1969 (Harvard Cold War Book Series), Lanham 2010, S. 85-109. 
110 P. MANGOLD, The almost impossible ally: Harold Macmillan and Charles de Gaulle, London 2006.  
111 The Bahamas-agreement foresaw that the US would provide British submarines with American Polaris 
missiles. Kennedy and Macmillan foresaw French participation. Yet, as the plan would eliminate the separate and 
particular “force de frappe” of the French Republic, they de facto drove France away from them. Memorandum 
Scheske, 28 December 1962, streng geheim, AAPD 1962-III, n°. 500, 2118-2120. 
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De Gaulle’s schemes for European integration saw Franco-German cooperation as the logical 
reaction to American-led integration of the Western bloc 112 . British-American separate 
meetings had irritated Konrad Adenauer as well113. Yet, from a German perspective, the French 
plans were ambivalent. On one hand, they could provide an alternative to complete dependence 
on American force114, as the United States were shifting their priorities to Asia115. Yet, on the 
other hand, they might give the USSR the impression of a divided –and thus vulnerable- 
Western bloc, and lure the United States into isolationism116.  
For America, paying for 350 000 troops on the ground in Europe was an expensive 
affair117. Robert McNamara (1916-2009), Kennedy’s Secretary of Defence, openly advocated 
a “flexible response” strategy from 1962 on118. This implied that the United States would 
                                                 
112 LOTH, Franco-German Relations and European Security (Anm. 81),  1957-1963,  S. 45. 
113 Conversation Adenauer/Jean Monnet, Bonn, 5 February 1962, geheim, AAPD 1962-I, N°. 55, 266 (on 
the 22 December 1961 communiqué concluding talks between Kennedy and Macmillan, a year before the Bahamas 
summit). 
114 E.g. Conversation de Gaulle/Adenauer, Düsseldorf, 6 September 1962, streng geheim, AAPD 1962-
III, N°. 347, 1502 (Adenauer) : “weil angeblich die Vereinigten Staaten eine bedeutende Veränderung hinsichtlich 
der nuklearen Verteidigung Europas vorgenommen hätten und nur dann nuklear eingreifen wollten, wenn die 
Vereinigten Staaten selbst angegriffen oder ein so großer Teil Europas von den Sowjets erobert würde, dass es für 
Amerika gefährlich werde.” 
115 Conversation Schröder/Couve de Murville, Bonn, 21 July 1966, geheim, AAPA, B 150, 80, p. 2 (Couve 
de Murville) : “die großen Probleme der jetzigen Zeit [lägen] in Asien, das heißt die großen Probleme, die zu einer 
Krise geführt hätten und Entscheidungen erforderten. Gegenwärtig gebe es in Europa keine Krise. Auch nicht in 
Afrika und in Amerika.” 
116 E.g. Conversation Adenauer/de Gaulle, Bonn, 5 September 1962, streng geheim, AAPD 1962-III; N°. 
346, 1494-1495 (Adenauer): “Frankreich und Deutschland seien gemeinsam von der Sowjetunion bedroht […] 
und die Natur der Dinge mache es zwingend, dass diese beide Länder einen politischen Damm gegen den [1495] 
Vormarsch des östlichen Kommunismus darstellten […] [1498] Sie seien beide unmittelbar bedroht. Unmittelbarer 
als England oder Amerika.” 
117 Memorandum Scheske, 28 December 1962, o.c. (Anm. 110), 2117. Adenauer estimated the American 
contribution to NATO’s total cost of 65 billion USD at 50 billion, or almost 77% (conversation Adenauer/De 
Gaulle, Baden-Baden, 15 February 1962, AAPD 1962-I, No. 73, 379). 
118 NATO Athens summit, May 1962; the previous doctrine, “massive retaliation”, adopted at the 1956 
NATO summit, was abandoned, also in light of the Cuba crisis, which had set the two superpowers on the verge 
of genuine nuclear war (September 1962; Memorandum Scheske to Gerhard Schröder, 28 December 1962, o.c. 
(Anm. 110), 2116). Massive retaliation would have meant a nuclear NATO response to any conventional Soviet 
advance into West Germany, and thus best suited the security needs of the Federal Republic. The switch to 
“flexible response” meant that a conventional confrontation in Germany, or a “limited war”, was no longer 
 24 
 
determine in which circumstances the USSR would sufficiently have altered the balance of 
power between the two blocs, to use nuclear firepower. Anything below this threshold would 
remain in the realm of conventional defence. Consequently, the European allies would have 
more to say, if they drove up the number of their own forces119, diminishing the financial burden 
for the United States120. Yet -in spite of Kennedy’s rhetoric on a Grand Design or a new 
Partnership121- in case of a war, for Germany in particular, this could imply a penetration of 
enemy forces into its territory for a considerable distance122.  
Adenauer, to whom war meant attacks on Frankfurt or Munich, or battles behind the 
Elbe, Weser or Scheldt123, and not theoretical confrontation on another continent, thousands of 
kilometres away, feared Washington might be tempted to conclude an agreement with the 
Soviet Union, at the expense of a divided Germany124. Logically, Adenauer turned to de Gaulle, 
albeit in a balancing act between Washington and Paris. The Chancellor relied on American 
diplomats and politicians active in the preceding decade125, with whom he had built a relation 
of confidence, e.g. John McCloy (1895-1989) 126  or Dean Acheson (1893-1971) 127 , and 
                                                 
excluded (o.c., 2122). German requests for tactical nuclear weapons, or middle-distance nuclear missiles were 
turned down. 
119 E.g. McNamara’s request to the Federal Republic, to drive up its land forces to 750 000, a proposal 
judged impracticable by Adenauer and Strauss (Conversation Adenauer/de Gaulle, Düsseldorf, streng geheim, 6 
September 1962, AAPD 1962-III, No. 347, 1503). 
120 Memorandum Werz, 13 February 1962, streng geheim, AAPD 1962-I, N° 70, 359. Paradoxically, the 
“flexible response”, a rhetorical device designed to shift means from one theatre to another, averred to have the 
inverse effect. The United States were carrying out “2,5 wars at the same time” in Asia, Europe, and a guerilla in 
Vietnam (P. MELANDRI, La politique extérieure des Etats-Unis de 1945 à nos jours (Politique d'aujourd'hui), 
Paris 1995², S.138).  
121 J.-B. DUROSELLE, Les États-Unis devant l’unification de l’Europe, in: Europe en formation (Déc 
1966), S. 12-15. 
122 Memorandum Scheske, 28 December 1962, o.c. (Anm. 110), 2122.  
123 Ibid., 2121. 
124 LOTH, Franco-German Relations and European Security (Anm. 81),  1957-1963,  S. 46. 
125 D. CLAY LARGE, Die deutsch-amerikanische Verteidigungspartnerschaft und die Sicherheit Europas 
1950-1968, in: D. JUNKER (Hg.), Die USA und Deutschland im Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges 1945-1990 München 
2001, S. 325-336. 
126 T.A. SCHWARTZ, America's Germany : John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany 
Cambridge (Mass.) 1991. 
127 R.L. BEISNER, Dean Acheson: a life in the Cold War Oxford 2006,  E.g. Acheson’s regret of the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations’ softer stance to Europe, expressed as follows in a conversation with Ludwig 
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simultaneously constructed a personal friendship with de Gaulle, from his 1958 visit to 
Colombey-les-deux-Églises on128. Conversely, de Gaulle never questioned the fundamental 
Franco-American alliance129. 
On 18 July 1961, the heads of government of the Six EEC member states solemnly declared 
their intention to enact the Treaties of Rome’s intentions to found a political union, through the 
creation of a commission, under the presidency of the French diplomat Christian Fouchet130. 
From the beginning on, the question of political union was intertwined with that of British 
accession. Britain had stayed out of the ECSC in 1951, both since it had important commercial 
relations with the Commonwealth-countries, and because it preferred the transformation of the 
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation to a genuine pan-European free trade 
zone131. Both the Benelux countries and Germany were in favour of a narrow cooperation with 
a prospective new big member state, which would serve to balance French influence.  
                                                 
Erhard (18 October 1963, o.c., 1338): “Er [Acheson] habe dem Präsidenten schon lange gepredigt, daβ 
Deutschland das Land sei, mit dem die Vereinigten Staaten am engsten zusammenarbeiten müβten. Der Grund 
dafür sei, daβ es nutzlos sei, die russische Politik beeinflussen zu wollen […] Beschlossen die Russen einmal bei 
sich, daβ der Zeitpunkt gekommen sei, um einen Schritt zu tun, dann brauche man keine Diplomatie, keine 
Diskussion und kein Argumentieren, um sie dazu zu bewegen. Gewöhnlich versuchten die Russen, eine 
unmögliche Bedingung daran zu knüpfen. Habe man diese […] abgelehnt, könne man sich auf das einigen, wozu 
die Russen von sich aus bereit seien. Wollten die Russen andererseits nicht mitmachen, dann helfe kein Überreden 
und kein Überzeugen.“ (our underlining)  
128 De Gaulle to Peyrefitte, 23 June 1964, after a meeting with Adenauer took longer than foreseen, 
causing Ludwig Erhard and two other cabinet ministers to wait on the French President: “J'étais avec Konrad 
Adenauer. J'étais séduit et conquis. Je n'ai pas vu le temps passer.” (PEYREFITTE, C’était de Gaulle (Anm. 2), S. 
II, 258). Adenauer’s visit to Colombey in 1958 meant that Germany could cooperate with de Gaulle, as well as 
previously, under the Fourth Republic, with the centre-parties (Christian democrats, radicals) and the centre-left 
(SFIO; K. CARSTENS, K.V. JENA & R. SCHMOECKEL, Erinnerungen und Erfahrungen (Schriften des 
Bundesarchivs), Boppard am Rhein 1993; see C. ANDRIEU, La France à la gauche de l'Europe, in: Le Mouvement 
Social (1986), S. 131-153. The image of Gaullism as an amalgam of Bonapartism, Boulangism or currents within 
the French Right during the Thirties, is not correct. The following of Charles de Gaulle, combined, as a political 
movement sui generis, several tendencies. Cf. André Malraux: “Le gaullisme, c’est comme le métro: on y 
rencontre tout le monde” (DE GARATE, Couve de Murville (1907-1999), S.215). 
129 E.g. Conversation Adenauer/de Gaulle, 15 February 1962, o.c., 380; Franco-German governmental 
meeting, Baden-Baden, 15 February 1962, streng geheim, AAPD 1962-I, N° 74, 393. 
130 Memorandum Lang (Anm. 79), 128. 
131 VAÏSSE, La Grandeur. Politique étrangère du Général de Gaulle, 1958-1969 (Anm. 71), S.165. 
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France, on the other hand, was eager to push through plans for a union of European 
states, encompassing the existing institutional structures (Council of Ministers, Commission, 
Parliament, Court of Justice). The European Political Union would constitute an umbrella over 
the Economic Communities. The European Commission would not have competence in the 
Political Union’s matters, but instead be replaced by a purely administrative organ132. Two 
organs would be necessary: a Council, consisting of the heads of state and government and 
ministers for foreign affairs133, seconded by an administrative Secretariat. De Gaulle opposed 
the latter institution, since it suggested a taint of supranationality134. 
In practice, the Council, operating as an intergovernmental organ and subject to the rule 
of unanimity, would have the residuary competence and thus become the prime mover for any 
new European policy135. In other words, whereas the proponents of economic integration saw 
the fusion of the sui generis institutions of the three Communities as the spearhead of European 
Union, the French tried to proceed the other way round. Council of Ministers, Commission and 
Parliamentary Assembly136 would first be subjected to the intergovernmental Council, to be 
merged in an ulterior phase137. The primacy of the intergovernmental modus operandi had 
considerable consequences. If a new policy did not meet with unanimous agreement, it would 
                                                 
132 Memorandum Josef Jansen, 22 January 1962, geheim, AAPD 1962-I, nr. 36, 204. 
133 Memorandum Lang (Anm. 79), 130. 
134 “Es handele sich um den Zusammenschluss von Staaten, und er wolle nicht, dass ein Behörde erfunden 
werde, die zwar kein Staat sei, aber die Staaten mehr oder weniger überwachen solle.” (Franco-German 
Governmental meeting, 15 February 1962, o.c., 386, our underlining) 
135 Memorandum Jansen (Anm. 131), 201: “Das Ziel sei nicht die Schaffung einer Allianz zwischen den 
sechs Staaten, sondern –in Ergänzung und Fortentwicklung der Europäischen Gemeinschaften- die Begründung 
einer Gemeinschaft und auch auf politischem Gebiet.” As to the objectives of the Fouchet Plan, the inclusion of 
the coordination of economic policy in the Union’s goals was seen as an incursion on the “weitgehende 
Zuständigkeit der Europäischen Gemeinschaften” (203; see as well Franco-German Governmental meeting, o.c., 
383-384). 
136 Adenauer: “Er habe […] gewisse Befürchtungen gehabt, dass die Menschen vielleicht noch nicht reif 
genug seien könnten, um in ein Europäisches Parlament zu gehen […] Es gebe allerdings schon so viele Wahlen 
und so viele Parlamente, dass ihm nicht sehr viel daran gelegen sei, noch weitere Wahlen bestreiten zu müssen.”; 
De Gaulle: “es gebe in Frankreich recht wenige ernstzunehmende Leute, die sich für ein Europäisches Parlament 
passionierten. Es sei ohnehin schon schwer genug, das nationale Parlament zu beschicken.“ (Franco-German 
Governmental meeting, 15 February 1962, o.c., 387).  
137 Memorandum Lang (Anm. 79), 130; Memorandum Jansen (Anm. 131), 200 (position of the Belgian 




either have to be carried on outside the European institutional framework 138 , or would 
necessitate the opposing country’s deliberate absence, in analogy with the USSR’s abstention 
in the UN Security Council139 . In essence, France and Germany tried to avoid a formal, 
individual veto by the smaller member states, but, instead, tried to retain an implicit joint veto 
by the major powers140. 
Again, in the French view, the problem of British accession would be solved by 
distinguishing membership of the (political) European Union from the (economic) European 
Communities, the latter being a precondition to the former. Consequently, Britain could adhere 
to the EEC, if the Political Union would have taken over the bulk of the integration process, to 
possibly find the door of the main organ, the new intergovernmental international organisation, 
shut 141 . The central role of law in the European integration process through the Court 
consequently risked to be reined in, as the Luxemburg judges would not have competence over 
the structures responding directly to the organs of the European Political Union142. Moreover, 
the Political Union would be financed by member states’ contributions, without interference of 
the Parliamentary Assembly143, whose role was finally reduced to the screening of an annual 
report submitted by the Council144. 
The Plan was damned. France’s emphasis on sovereignty and on an institutional two-track 
between European Economic Communities and Political Union was irreconcilable with the 
other member states’ views, who saw the existing Communities as the only possible framework 
for an enlargement of their cooperation145. Even for its most convinced sponsors within the 
                                                 
138  E.g. de Gaulle giving the example of a joint project between France, Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands, with Belgium as sole objector. The other four countries (omitting Luxemburg) would be forced to 
drop the project (Franco-German governmental meeting, 15 February 1962 o.c., 384-385).  
139 Adenauer, Franco-German governmental meeting, Baden-Baden, 15 February 1962, o.c., 385. 
140 “Wenn diese beiden Länder sich nicht einigten, gäbe es weder einen Rat noch einen Europäischen 
Bund, noch ein solcher Bund dann überhaupt erforderlich.” (De Gaulle, Franco-German governmental meeting, 
Baden-Baden, o.c., 388). Carstens suggested to adopt the ECSC voting system (art. 28, Treaty of 18 April 1951), 
whereby the threshold consisted of “Deutschland und Frankreich und noch ein beliebiges weiteres Land (selbst 
Luxemburg genügt)” (ibid.).  
141 Memorandum Jansen (Anm. 131), 205. 
142 Memorandum Lang (Anm. 79), 132. 
143 Memorandum Lang (Anm. 79), 132. 
144 Memorandum Jansen (Anm. 131), 205. 
145 Memorandum Voigt, geheim, 21 May 1962, AAPD 1962-II, N°. 214, 964. 
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EEC, British accession was tied to a pure acceptance of the acquis of European integration by 
the British (‘ohne Reserve’146). By contrast, sensitive issues as agriculture, coal and steel, 
textiles or voting rights in the Council of Ministers would provide substantial negotiation 
issues147. Yet, even if the Netherlands and West Germany abandoned their initial precondition 
about British EEC-membership148, the institutional aspects of the French proposal inevitably 
backfired149. The intergovernmental Grand Design was stalled. 
Consequently, Adenauer suggested to leave the European Political Union in suspense150 and to 
move on with Franco-German cooperation, in a classical bilateral treaty, outside the 
Communities’ legal framework. 
Horst Osterheld (1919-1998) 151 , Adenauer’s chief adviser in foreign affairs, feared for a 
complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe against a too exclusive Franco-
German pact152. Yet, the battle was fought in the CDU fraction, and not in court: Adenauer’s 
                                                 
146 Memorandum Jansen, 17 July 1962, AAPD 1962-II, N°. 289, 1290. Next to the British demand, 
Denmark, Norway and Ireland had applications filed as well in 1961-1962 (Memorandum Lahr, 18 July 1962, 
AAPD 1962-II, N°. 291, 1295). Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, Spain (all 1962) and Turkey (1959) had asked for 
an association agreement, which Greece had already signed on 9 July 1961 (O.J. 1963, 294-263). Jansen remarked 
the stark contrast between French (and Belgian) eagerness for the conclusion of association agreements with the 
former African colonies and de Gaulle’s indifference regarding the other states (ibid, 1296). 
147 E.g. Conversation Adenauer/De Gaulle, Bonn, 5 September 1962, streng geheim, AAPD 1962-III, No. 
364, 1495. 
148 N. PIERS LUDLOW, Dealing with Britain: the Six and first UK application to the EEC (Cambridge 
Studies in International Relations; 56), Cambridge 1997, S. 236-237. 
149 E.g. Memorandum Voigt, o.c., 965: “Es kann sogar bezweifelt werden, ob selbst ein der Römischen 
Verträgen entsprechender politischer Vertrag, wenn er nur unter den Sechs geschlossen werden soll, von Belgien 
und den Niederlanden heute akzeptiert werden würde.“ 
150 Conversation Adenauer/De Gaulle, 5 September 1962, o.c., 1496:, “Seither sei alles in der Schwebe. 
Wenn es nach ihm [Adenauer] gehe und de Gaulle ihn nicht vom Gegenteil überzeuge, solle man es auch in der 
Schwebe lassen. Das deutsch-französisches Verhältnis aber müsse geregelt werden. Dies liege ihm sehr am 
Herzen. Je grösser die Gefahr der Bedrohung aus dem Osten sei, um so notwendiger sei es, dass Frankreich und 
Deutschland eine gemeinsame Politik hätten.” (our underlining) 
151 H. OSTERHELD, Außenpolitik unter Bundeskanzler Ludwig Erhard 1963-1966 (Forschungen und 
Quellen zur Zeitgeschichte ; 23), Düsseldorf 1992; H. OSTERHELD, Konrad Adenauer: ein Charakterbild 
Stuttgart 1987. 
152 LOTH, Franco-German Relations and European Security (Anm. 81),  1957-1963,  S. 50. 
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party compelled the Chancellor to insert a preamble153 radically opposite to the actual aims of 
de Gaulle: Germany reaffirmed its ties with the US, and the aim to admit Britain to the EEC154.  
Outside of Europe, De Gaulle’s ideas had more appeal. According to Chinese archives, the 
multipolar discourse provided the “intellectual justification and foundation” for Mao’s 
rapprochement with France155, culminating in the recognition of the PRC on 27 January 1964, 
an act condemned by both the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany156. Frustrated 
as France with the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and annoyed by Soviet rivalry for 
dominance in Central Asia, Mao turned away from support to Algeria or Indochina, two very 
sensitive arena’s where he confronted France157. 
Going out into the wider world, from which it had retreated as a colonial power, France now 
had “bargaining power” between the Communist bloc and the US158. France had succeeded its 
decolonisation of Algeria159, and could purport to play the role of impartial mediator. Yet, the 
                                                 
153 M. BOTHE, Völkerrechtliche Praxis der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Jahre 1963, in: Zeitschrift 
für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht XXV (1965), S. 227-281. 
154 “Ils font comme s'ils ne voulaient pas que ça soit un traité d'amitié et de coopération privilégiée. Ils en 
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qu'il y a des partisans de l'Europe, et les partisans du protectorat. Alors, je suis pour l'Europe, je ne suis pas pour 
le protectorat.” (De Gaulle to Peyrefitte, 23 June 1964, PEYREFITTE, C’était de Gaulle (Anm. 2), S. II, 257). 
 155 B. KROUCK, De Gaulle et la Chine: la politique française à l’égard de la République populaire de Chine 
Paris 2012; G. MARTIN, Playing the China Card ? Revisiting France’s Recognition of Communist China, 1963-
1964, in: Journal of Cold War Studies X (2008), S. 52-80 ; Q. ZHAI, Seeking a Multipolar World: China and de 
Gaulle’s France, in: C. NUENLIST, A. LOCHER & G. MARTIN (Hg.), Globalizing de Gaulle : international 
perspectives on French  foreign  policies,  1958-1969 Lanham 2010, S. 190.  
156 Ludwig Erhard’s visit to the United States, 12-13 June 1964. De Gaulle to Peyrefitte, 7 July 1964: “Il 
n'a pas besoin de s'en mêler ! Pourquoi a-t-il besoin de condamner ? C'est un peu fort ! À quoi sert le traité franco-
allemand ? Il s'est laissé imposer ce communiqué par les Américains. Comme il se laisse imposer les armements 
américains, au lieu d'en faire fabriquer avec nous [...] L'idéal de la vie politique pour lui, c'est de dire qu'il est bien 
avec tout le monde dans ses communiqués. Il est peut-être très fort en économie, mais finalement c'est un pauvre 
type.” (PEYREFITTE, C’était de Gaulle (Anm. 2), S. II,263). 
157 ZHAI, Seeking a Multipolar World: China and de Gaulle’s France (Anm. 154),  S. 191. 
158 Y. TORIKATA, The U.S. Escalation in Vietnam and de Gaulle’s Secret Search for Peace, 1964- 
1966, in: C. NUENLIST, A. LOCHER & G. MARTIN (Hg.), Globalizing de Gaulle : international perspectives 
on French  foreign  policies,  1958-1969 (Harvard Cold War Book Series), Lanham 2010, S. 156. 
159 M. VAÏSSE, Comment de Gaulle fit échouer le putsch d’Alger Bruxelles 2011; ID. (Hg.), De Gaulle 
et l’Algérie, 1943-1969 (Recherches), Paris 2012.  
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margins were reduced, as concessions America made or military actions undertaken in one 
sphere of the globe, could have their repercussions in the theatre most vital to France: Europe160. 
British accession was largely conditional to a choice of the EEC over the Commonwealth161. 
At the time of the Schuman-Monnet-plan, Britain had declined invitations to join162. Likewise, 
transatlantic economic integration and the EEC were two different processes163. De Gaulle saw 
Britain as a bridgehead linking these two processes, and well to the detriment of the latter164. 
Finally, the legal framework of the Communities was used by de Gaulle to force Britain to 
choose the EEC over its other engagements, such as EFTA: 
“On a fait la Communauté des Six, d’ailleurs sans moi, on aurait pu faire autre chose : 
une zone de libre-échange européenne, qui aurait peut-être mieux valu. Mais c’est la 
Communauté qui a été faite avec ses règles et ses conditions et qui a été une réalisation 
                                                 
160 Torikata, The U.S. Escalation in Vietnam and de Gaulle’s Secret Search for Peace, 1964-1966 (Anm. 
157), S. 157. 
161 Conversation between Adenauer and de Gaulle, Paris, 21 January 1963, o.c., 7. (de Gaulle): “England 
befinde sich in einer sehr schwierigen Lage, weil es sich entscheiden müsse, ob es dem Commonwealth Lebewohl 
sagen solle oder nicht.“ Moreover, the legal effects of EEC accession were underestimated by the Macmillan 
government, at the image of Chancellor of the Exchequer Lord Dilhorne’s August 1962 statement in the Lords 
that –after accession- “EEC legislation would not affect the majority of British people’s lives” (N.S. MARSH, Le 
Royaume-Uni devant les problèmes juridiques du Marché Commun, in: Revue internationale de droit comparé 
XV (1963), S. 649-661). 
162 Conversation Adenauer/de Gaulle, Bonn, 5 September 1962, o.c., 1495. 
163  N. WELTER, Die Kennedy-Runde, in: Die Internationale Politik (1966-1967), S. 405-425; H. 
WALKER, Dispute Settlement: The Chicken War, in: American Journal of International Law LVIII (1964), S. 
671-685. 
164 E.g. Conversation de Gaulle/Harold Wilson, at the occasion of Wilson’s bid for British membership 
of the EEC, Trianon (Versailles) 19 June 1967, DDF, 1967, N° 320, 770 (de Gaulle) : “Nous nous sommes résignés 
à une politique sinon d’intégration, du moins de coopération continentale et européenne organisée précisément 
pour échapper à une telle domination. Nous ne sommes pourtant pas sûrs que si vous entrez un jour ou l’autre dans 
la Communauté, cette Communauté atlantique ne se produirait pas. Vous aurez beau être dans la Communauté 
européenne, vous resterez comme vous êtes. En fait, vous introduirez, même si vous n’y tenez pas et si le 
gouvernement britannique [Labour/Wilson] n’y tient pas aujourd’hui, un élément dans l’ensemble favorable à 
l’affaire atlantique […] Or, nous ne sommes entrés dans la Communauté que pour l’empêcher. Si, pendant et après 
la guerre et même maintenant, il y avait eu un Royaume-Uni tout à fait séparé […] et résolu à faire son chemin, 
peut-être que nous n’aurions pas eu la même attitude à votre égard et moi-même, qui vous suisf depuis vingt-sept 
ans, je n’aurais pas été aussi circonspect dans les affaires européennes ; et je le suis car je vous ai toujours vus, que 
vous le vouliez ou non, liés aux États-Unis.” (our underlining) 
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pénible. Là-dessus, vous arrivez. Comment allez-vous être là-dedans ? Mettez-vous à 
notre place165.” 
II. Erhard, or desilussion 
De Gaulle’s Grand design to form a Franco-German tandem leading the Six on an independent 
and “truly European” course failed. As Ludwig Erhard took over the Bundeskanzleramt in 1963, 
Germany firmly chose Washington over Paris as its privileged partner166, symbolised by the 
personal sympathy between Lyndon Johnson167 and the new Chancellor, who met already in 
December 1963, and the ensuing commercial weapons agreement (5 November 1964). This 
reflected a fundamental difference in political ideas. Whereas De Gaulle (or Adenauer168) 
firmly camped on traditional high politics169, Erhard, “Father of the DMark” saw the economy 
                                                 
165 Conversation de Gaulle/Wilson, 19 June 1967, o.c., 771. 
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14 January 1966, geheim, AAPD 1966-I, No. 8, 24). See L. ERHARD, Die formierte Gesellschaft : Ludwig Erhards 
gedanken zur politischen Ordnung Deutschlands : Reden und Interviews des Bundeskanzlers und bemerkenswerte 
Stellungnahmen Bonn 1966. 
167 W.I. COHEN & N. TUCKER (Hg.), Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World. American foreign policy 
1963-1968 Cambridge 1994; L. GARDNER, Lyndon Johnson and de Gaulle, in: R.O. PAXTON & N. WAHL 
(Hg.), De Gaulle and the United States Oxford 1994, S. 257-278 ; T.A. SCHWARTZ, Lyndon Johnson and Europe 
Cambridge (Mass.) 2003.  
168 U. LAPPENKÜPER, "Ein Europa der Freien und Gleichen”: la politique européenne de Ludwig 
Erhard (1963-1966), in: W. LOTH (Hg.), Crises and Compromises: the European Project 1963-1969 (Groupe de 
liaison des historiens auprès des Communautés ; 8), Baden-Baden/Bruxelles 2001, S. 74. 
169 “L’économie, c’est l’intendance”, B. SCHOENBORN, Les réticences du chancelier Erhard à l'égard 
de la France (1963-1966), in: Relations internationales (2006/2), S. 3-13, hier 5. 
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as the most important field170 and relied completely on the United States for defence171. De 
Gaulle’s political and legal positions were incomprehensible to him172, and were seen as the 
causes of transatlantic trouble173. In this respect, Erhard echoed American interpretations of 
rising nationalism in Europe174 or the perceived inadequacy of the nation-state with regard to 
20th Century problems175, leading e.g. Dean Acheson to qualify British insistence on a national 
                                                 
170  L. ERHARD, Deutschlands Rückkehr zum Weltmarkt Düsseldorf 1954; L. ERHARD & K. 
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des Américains. Ils trahissent l'esprit du traité franco-allemand. Et ils trahissent l'Europe” PEYREFITTE, C’était 
de Gaulle (Anm. 2), S. II, 270). De Gaulle’s emotional phrase is a reaction to the agreement on armaments between 
Robert Macnamara and Kai-Uwe von Hassel, Minister for Defence in Erhard’s government. This agreement 
rendered Germany dependant on American procurers (KISSINGER, The Troubled Partnership: A Re-Appraisal 
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part the American balance of payment deficit (the same idea was behind the integration of the American and EEC 
markets in GATT and OECD: the US counted on a counterpart by the European nations it had helped in the 
Marshall Plan; see P. MELANDRI, La politique extérieure des États-Unis de 1945 à nos jours (Anm. 119), S.122; 
R.A. BLASIUS (Hg.), Von Adenauer zu Erhard : Studien zur auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
1963 (Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte ; 68), München 1994, S. 34. In turn, at Erhard’s exit, 
the American insistence on the weapons deal was seen as a cause of budgetary problems (Seydoux de Clausonne 
to Couve de Murville, Berlin, 3 January 1967, DDF 1967, Nr. 2, 6). 
172 An alternative, but not fundamentally different, assessment can be found with A.C. MIERZEJEWSKI, 
Ludwig Erhard. A biography Chapel Hill 2004, S.29: “Erhard understood politics; therefore he rejected it, saw 
himself as the educator who would teach the German people the values of free market and democracy”. Erhard 
never formally adhered to the CDU. 
173 Conversation Erhard/Dean Acheson, Bonn, 19 October 1963, AAPD 1963-III, No. 393, 1336.  
174 J.W. FULLBRIGHT, Les pays occidentaux doivent choisir entre le nationalisme qui divise et une 
politique d'association prospère, in: Le Monde Diplomatique XI (mars 1964), S. 1-2. 
175 KISSINGER, The Troubled Partnership: A Re-Appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (Anm. 31), S.229. 
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nuclear defence as “English Gaullism176”. De Gaulle, in turn, found Erhard had no original 
political opinions, and seemed at a loss to construct his foreign policy177. 
For Erhard, de Gaulle maliciously kept Britain and the EFTA countries at a distance178, 
contrary to German economic interests 179 . The German Chancellor abhorred of EEC 
bureaucracy180 or political bargaining and aspired to a “functional economic integration of all 
free countries in Europe181.” This is a fundamental difference between French and German 
conceptions. Whereas the latter saw Atlantic and economic integration as a pathway to 
prosperity and progress, the former adhered to a revival of nationalism, or, popular legitimacy 
for sovereign states, which would inevitably lead to different outcomes around the world, and 
thus to a multipolar world182. For Erhard, who made a staggering career after decades of relative 
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1963 meeting with the fresh Chancellor, De Gaulle tried to construct a common ground, by quoting one of Erhard’s 
speeches on the ill effects of a supra-national bureaucracy (KUSTERER, Le Général et le Chancelier, S.359). 
181 LAPPENKÜPER, "Europa aus der Lethargie herausreißen": Ludwig Erhards Europapolitik 1949-
1966,  S. 107. 
182 J. LACOUTURE, De Gaulle, t. 3: le souverain Paris 1986, S.342: Jean Lacouture’s phrase that the 
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discretion as a university professor, 1945 had been Stunde Null for the world as well183. De 
Gaulle, on the other hand, saw a continuous history of Europe, and recurring patterns in 
geopolitics as the main mover of foreign policy184. 
As German-German questions were concerned, France steered on the course of détente185, 
aimed at a consensual end to the Cold War. Yet, for the Federal Republic, talks with the 
“Sovietische Besatzungszone” were much more delicate. In the follow-up of de Gaulle’s 
NATO-decision, Foreign Affairs minister Maurice Couve de Murville bluntly declared to his 
German colleague Gerhard Schröder186 that: 
“Deutschland ja nicht nur geographisch im Zentrum Europas liege, sondern auch im 
Mittelpunkt der europäischen Probleme. Frankreich könne hierzu allerdings nichts tun. 
Da lege Wert auf die Entwicklung seiner eigenen Beziehungen, die es für nützlich halte, 
und habe die Absicht, auf diesem Weg fortzuschreiben. Man würde es auf französischer 
Seite für nützlich halten, wenn andere europäische Länder den gleichen Weg 
einschlagen würden, könne sie aber nicht in diesen Sinne beeinflussen187.“ 
Section 2: The Empty Chair Crisis 
“Le marché commun agricole, ça ne peut pas rater ! 
Ou bien le Marché commun lui-même ratera […] Les 
autres, notamment les Allemands, tiennent à leur 
Marché commun; or, ils ne l'auront pas sans mon 
Marché commun agricole; donc je l'aurai.” 
                                                 
for that would destroy the Concert of Europe principle, which was that the major powers must act together on 
questions of common interest and preserve the peace through concerted diplomatic action.” 
183 J.M. LUKOMSKI, Ludwig Erhard: der Mensch und der Politiker Düsseldorf 1965, S.59. 
184 A.W. DE PORTE, Europe between the Superpowers: the enduring balance (Council on Foreign 
Relations Books), New Haven 1986, S.x. 
185 W. LOTH & G.-H. SOUTOU (Hg.), The making of détente : Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold 
War, 1965-75 (Cold War History Series; 20), London 2008; V. DUJARDIN, Pierre Harmel: Biographie 
(Biographie), Bruxelles 2004. 
186 Gerhard Schröder (1910-1989), minister for foreign affairs (1961-1966). Atlanticist, but a rival of 
Ludwig Erhard. See G. SCHRÖDER, Wir brauchen eine heile Welt. Politik in und für Deutschland Wien 1963; 
T. OPPELLAND, Gerhard Schröder (1910-1989). Politik zwischen Staat, Partei und Konfession (Forschungen 
und Quellen zur Zeitgeschichte; 39), Düsseldorf 2002. 
187 Conversation Schröder/Couve de Murville, 21 July 1966, o.c., 15. 
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De Gaulle at the French Council of Ministers, 1 July 
1964188 
“Frankreich unternimmt einen konzentrischen 
Angriff auf die Europäische Kommission, sowohl auf 
ihre Rolle wie auf ihre personelle Zusammensetzung 
[…] Das im Rom-Vertrag niedergelegte Prinzip der 
Mehrheitsentscheidung (Artikel 148) wird durch ein 
„liberum veto“ beseitigt […] Was die französische 
Haltung darüber hinaus besonders bedenklich 
erscheinen lässt, ist, dass diese Ziele mit der „Politik 
des leeren Stuhls“ erreicht werden sollen. Diese 
Politik stellt einen Vertragsbruch dar.” 
Secretary of State Rudolf Lahr, 19 January 1966189 
Contrary to De Gaulle’s basic assumptions, the Court of Justice was transforming the European 
Communities to an autonomous and supranational order, more in the sense of the 1951 ECSC 
Treaty190 than of the 1957 EEC Treaties191. Yet, for France, the EEC should serve to protect her 
economic interests in the trans-Atlantic trade within GATT, implying a slower start of the 
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191 J. MÉGRET, La spécificité du droit communautaire et harmonisation des législations nationales, in: 
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Kennedy Round liberalisation talks, which opened in Geneva on 4 May 1964192. Similarly, de 
Gaulle saw the EEC as a pool to draw allies for his attack on the gold exchange standard, when 
he announced his request to physically exchange the dollars detained by the Banque de France 
for gold (Press Conference, 4 February 1965193). 
The Empty Chair Crisis (December 1965-January 1966) was an attempt to rein in the 
functioning of the EEC, stressing the state consent-based nature of the Treaties of Rome. Yet, 
French insistence on de facto veto powers could not meet with success. De Gaulle had secured 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in a bilateral deal with Adenauer (31 December 1963 
agreement in the Council of Ministers), and, again, with his successor Erhard194 (15 December 
1964195). Thus, it was of prime importance that France offered concessions to the other parties 
as well. Abandoning the letter and spirit of the Rome Treaties was incompatible with clinging 
on to the CAP. Again, in Lahr’s words: 
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commun: tout au moins en principe. Si jamais ça se réalise à la fin des fins, c'est seulement parce que je l'aurais 
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1965, PEYREFITTE, C’était de Gaulle (Anm. 2), S. II, 298). It would take us too far to analyse the CAP 
negotiations in detail within the frame of this dissertation. I refer to C. GERMOND, The Agricultural Bone of 
Contention: The Franco-German Tandem and the Making of the CAP, 1963-1966, in: Journal of European 
Integration History XVI (2010), S. 25-44; M. SPOERER, ”Fortress Europe” in LongSpoerer-term Perspective: 
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“Wir haben Große Sorge, dass die Gemeinschaft künftig mehr und mehr denaturiert 
wird, dass das Leben in der Gemeinschaft unerfreuliche Formen annehmen wird und 
dass die materiellen Opfer, die für Europa bisher schon gebracht worden sind und weiter 
gefordert werden, ihren politischen Sinn verlieren. Wir halten es für eine Widerspruch, 
einerseits für eine straff organisierte gemeinsame Agrarpolitik einzutreten, andererseits 
aber den politischen Gehalt des Rom-Vertrages auszuholen und die nichtagrarischen 
Bereiche zu vernachlässigen, mindestens aber ihre Zukunft im Ungewissen zu 
lassen196.“ 
I. Hallstein’s bold reform plan 
“Il n'est pas imaginable que, le 1er janvier 1966, notre 
économie soit soumise à une règle de la majorité qui 
nous imposera la volonté de nos partenaires, dont on 
a vu qu'ils pouvaient se coaliser contre nous. Il faudra 
profiter de l'occasion pour réviser les fausses 
conceptions qui nous exposaient à subir le diktat des 
autres. Révisons cette stupidité!” 
De Gaulle at the French Council of Ministers, 7 July 
1965197 
At his 9 September 1965 press conference, De Gaulle characterized the European Commission 
as an “aréopage technocratique, apolitique, irresponsable”. Commission President Hallstein 
was the direct cause of this outburst198, as he had presented bold plans for reform to the 
European Parliamentary Assembly in Spring 1965 (23 March199). For the Commission, article 
155 EEC, specifying its coordinating role with regards to national policies, was insufficient. 
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Hallstein was in favour of a stronger structure, whereby the Parliamentary Assembly would 
directly control the Commission’s budget, as the Bundestag did in the German Federal 
Republic200. 
The issue of CAP financing would lead to a confrontation on the big lines: traditional 
international law-consensualism versus European law-activism. The Commission put forward 
its proposals for a financial settlement on 1 July 1965, linking the completion of the CAP’s 
financing to a far more structural decision to attribute custom revenue directly to the 
Community, under parliamentary control201. This “serment de jeu de paume202” was a bridge 
too far for de Gaulle, who abhorred of the idea of a supranational regalian “state” and had 
previously strongly opposed the accreditation of diplomats to the Commission. Handing over a 
genuine budget to the European Parliament (“l’Assemblée de Strasbourg”) would turn the 
intergovernmental Council of Ministers from legislator to a second chamber, equivalent to the 
German Bundesrat or the French Senate203. 
Moreover, the Treaty of Rome on the EEC foresaw in its article 148 that, from 1 January 1966 
on, decisions within the Council of Ministers would be subject to Qualified Majority Vote204, 
                                                 
200 M. SCHÖNWALD, Walter Hallstein and the 'Empty Chair'-crisis 1965/1966,  ibid.(Hg.), S. 157-172. 
201 N.P. LUDLOW, The European Community and the crises of the 1960s : negotiating the Gaullist 
challenge (Cass series. Cold War history; 9), London 2006, S.71-93. 
202 Words of Commission Vice-President Robert Marjolin, in an allusion to the decision of the French 
Third Estate at Versailles, reported by VAÏSSE, La politique européenne de la France en 1965: pourquoi 'la chaise 
vide' ? (Anm. 198),  S. 212. 
203 De Gaulle to the French Council of Ministers, 14 April 1965, PEYREFITTE, C’était de Gaulle (Anm. 
2), S. II, 281-286: “Oui ou non, acceptons-nous que l'administration de la Communauté, notamment en matière 
financière, soit en fait attribuée à la Commission de Bruxelles, et contrôlée par l'Assemblée de Strasbourg ? 
L'accepter, c'est dépouiller les gouvernements de leurs prérogatives. C'est supranationaliser toute la CEE. C'est 
abandonner des fonds énormes à des organismes sans aucune responsabilité. A Bruxelles, ce ne sont pas des élus, 
ce sont des gens qui ne relèvent de personne. Ils n'ont que la responsabilité des propos [282] qu'ils tiennent, ils 
bombinent dans le vide, comme la coquecigrue de Rabelais" [...] La France a vécu avant le traité de Rome et pourra 
vivre après sa mise en sommeil.” 
204 The adoption of a proposal required twelve positive votes. France, Germany and Italy each had four 
votes, Belgium and the Netherlands two, and Luxemburg one (Memorandum Carstens, 6 July 1962, vertraulich, 
AAPD 1962-II, N° 278, 1241).  
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abandoning the traditional interpretation of equality between sovereign states205. Consequently, 
the CAP’s financing agreement, which came at an end on 30 June 1965, could be revised by 
the Five other members states if no consensus was reached206.  When bilateral Franco-German 
talks on CAP financing broke down in July 1965, de Gaulle decided to take advantage of 
Hallstein’s faux pas207, and to block the European institutions208.  
II. “A la fin de l’année, on les ramassera à la cuiller 209 ”: France against 
supranationality 
“Mon cher ami vous nous proposez quelque chose 
que nous n’aimons pas : l’adhésion de l’Angleterre et 
pour nous le faire accepter, vous y ajoutez quelque 
chose que nous détestons encore beaucoup plus, qui 
est la supranationalité, donc vous n’avez aucune 
chance de nous convaincre.” 
Jean-Marc Boegner (French permanent 
representative to the EEC) to Robert Toulemon, chief 
of cabinet to Robert Marjolin (Vice-President of the 
Commission)210 
On 6 July 1965, the French permanent representative at the COREPER quit his seat211. Two 
months later, Charles de Gaulle sent out a crossfire of verbal missiles against the supranational 
                                                 
205 E.D.W. DICKINSON, The Equality of States in International Law (Harvard studies in jurisprudence; 
3), Buffalo, NY 2003 [1920]; J. GOEBEL, The Equality of States. A Study in the History of the Law New York 
1923. 
206 VAÏSSE, La politique européenne de la France en 1965: pourquoi 'la chaise vide' ? (Anm. 198),  S. 
202. 
207 J.-P. Brunet, Note “Conditions dans lesquelles ont été rompues, le 30 juin, les négociations sur le 
réglement financier. Responsabilité particulière de l’Allemagne”, Paris, 1 February 1966, DDF 1966, No. 86, 212-
214; PEYREFITTE, C’était de Gaulle (Anm. 2), S. II,288. 
208 “Quant à la Commission, elle ne l'emportera pas en paradis ! Je lui règlerai son compte ! Hallstein, 
Marjolin et Mansholt, c'est fini ! Je ne les renouvellerai pas !” (De Gaulle to Alain Peyrefitte, Schloss Ernich by 
the Rhine, 12 June 1965 (PEYREFITTE, C’était de Gaulle (Anm. 2), S. II, 288)). 
209 De Gaulle to Peyrefitte, 21 July 1965, ibid., S. II, 294. 
210 Quoted in Bossuat “La culture de l’unité”, 73. 
211 J. NEWHOUSE, Collision in Brussels : the Common Market crisis of 30 June, 1965 New York 1967,  
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conception of European integration212. In private, the President equalled the introduction of 
Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of Ministers to the loss of French sovereignty213, 
called for a revision of the treaty, implying abandoning supranationality and QMV altogether, 
and for the dismissal of the whole Commission214. 
The chances of success were extremely reduced, not to say inexistent. France’s partners were 
shocked at this challenge to the very core principles behind the European treaties215. De Gaulle 
counted on bilateral talks between France and its EEC partners, completely bypassing their 
common institutions, thus, in practice applying the Fouchet Plan, which they had refused 
earlier216. France’s trump card was that it could not be missed in the European integration 
process, and the essential sovereign consent-underpinning of the European treaty217. However, 
making this argument hard required either an exit from the EEC (which implied abandoning 
                                                 
212 De Gaulle in the French Council of Ministers, 1 July 1965, associated Common Market officials with 
his former political opponents in the Fourth Republic: “Le problème, c'est que toute cette mafia de 
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2), S. II,291. 
213 De Gaulle to Peyrefitte, 8 September 1965, Ibid., S. II, 299.  
214 “il faut réviser le Traité de Rome et renvoyer cette Commission”, de Gaulle to Peyrefitte, 21 July 1965, 
o.c., II, 297. 
215 É. DESCHAMPS, Pacta sunt servanda. Spaak, la France et al crise de la chaise vide (1965-1966), in: 
G. DUCHENNE, M. DUMOULIN & V. DUJARDIN (Hg.), Paul-Henri Spaak et la France Bruxelles 2007, S. 
201-224 ; A.G. HARRYVAN & J. VAN DER HARST, For once a united front.The Netherlands and the empty 
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Baden-Baden/Bruxelles 2001, S. 173-191. 
216 P. BAJON, Europapolitik “am Abgrund”. Die Krise des “leeren Stuhls” 1965-1966 (Anm. 215) (Anm. 
215)(Studien zur Geschichte der Europäischen Integration - Studies on the History of European Integration - 
Études sur l'Histoire de l'Intégration Européenne; 15), Wien 2012, S.211. 
217 Ibid., S. 257. 
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the hard-fought CAP, which served as a counterpart to the German-desired customs union218), 
or a treaty revision (which required unanimity). If France did not go this far, its representatives’ 
absence at the Council of Ministers would not necessarily put a stop to EEC activity219 . 
Moreover, French Presidential elections, which took place in the month of December, were a 
warning to de Gaulle, who fell short of a majority in the first round (44,64%) and was criticised 
by pro-integration centre candidate Jean Lecanuet (15,57%)220.  
Finally, an exceptional Council of Ministers was scheduled in Luxemburg for 13 and 14 January 
1966, a good month after the French Presidential elections. This meeting initiated the final 
phase of discussions. France’s bilateral strategy had failed, since the other member states held 
on to the common forum to resolve the question 221 . Consequently, a treaty change to 
accommodate French wishes was excluded. Instead, de Gaulle counted on a multilateral 
protocol declaration, serving as an interpretation of the treaty222. Unanimity would function as 
the primary objective of EEC talks, irrespective of the possibility to apply QMV. Any state 
which felt threatened in its essential interest, could object to a potentially harmful decision. On 
29 January 1966, at the end of a six month-rhetorical struggle, the five other member countries 
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Verfahrens- und Verhaltensabsprache.” 
 42 
 
accepted an interpretative declaration on QMV223, as well as a French-inspired “heptalogue” of 
seven points to rein in the Commission’s activities224.  
The final text stated that, in case of a potentially harmful decision to vital interests of 
one of the Member States, the other Council members will elaborate a solution agreeable to all 
of them, and the interests of the Community. In the French interpretation, this amounted to the 
formal engagement to pursue discussions (and not proceed to a vote) until a final deal was 
reached225. In case of failure, disagreements persisted between France and the five others. The 
minutes of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on 28 January 1966 mark the ambiguous 
character of the first compromise226: 
Couve de Murville: “Si le traité [de Rome] n’est pas changé, les règles sont aussi inchangées. Évidemment 
si vous passez outre, il y a conflit.” 
Werner [Luxemburg]: “Excluez-vous l’application du traité ?” 
Couve de Murville: “Je me tue à vous le dire depuis quinze jours.” 
Schröder: “Si après tous ces efforts, quelque chose reste non résolu, et que les cinq pays soient d’accord, 
le vote majoritaire est-il possible ?” 
Couve de Murville: “[…] La question de M. Schröder me paraît académique, car si les cinq passaient 
outre, ils feraient par définition des choses non raisonnables.” 
Schröder: “Que ferez-vous ?” 
Couve de Murville: “Ou bien nous accepterons, ou bien il y aura une histoire sérieuse […]. Il faut 
distinguer entre le droit et la politique. La Communauté doit fonctionner par accord. Le droit reste inchangé. Il y 
a les conséquences politiques.” 
 
The eventual compromise, an “agreement to disagree”, could be interpreted in all possible ways, 
to such an extent that the question could be asked if it had altered anything to the letter of the 
EEC Treaty227. More fundamentally, who was to identify a “vital national interest” able to 
temporarily invalidate QMV 228  ? For France, an individual member state decided in a 
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discretionary way. For Germany, on the other hand, fixing the threshold was a collective 
competence229 . Why should the other states rely on a unilateral statement by one of the 
partners230? In the German view, even the horizontal, or traditional treaty-based strand of 
European integration, was submitted to the common obligation to coordinate economic policy, 
contained in Article 6 EEC231. A non-agreement on the non-application of the majority rule 
equalled its confirmation232. In any case, the sanction in case of an effective QMV-outcome 
against France could not be anything but a political one (cf. Couve de Murville: “il y aura une 
histoire sérieuse”). In theory, political agreements have their sanction in the reciprocal character 
of the agreement. In the case of the Luxemburg compromise, France was the sole beneficiary233. 
Yet, the political impetus of European integration had changed under the menace of a looming 
“Veto culture”234, which, in the short run, assured France not to be outvoted in agricultural 
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325. 
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wirksamen Durchführung des Vertrags findet diese Rücksichtnahme allerdings ihre Grenze.” (our underlining) 
232 E.g. Mosler saw the Luxemburg compromise as an agreement outside the formal framework of the 
competences attributed to the Council of Ministers by the EEC treaty. The six member states had concluded a 
political agreement not to use the possibility to use QMV. Mosler equated this to a common press statement by 
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234 Cf. “poisoning” of the atmosphere (BAJON, Europapolitik “am Abgrund”. Die Krise des “leeren 
Stuhls” 1965-1966 (Anm. 215), S.310); NEWHOUSE, Collision in Brussels : the Common Market crisis of 30 
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issues, and Germany not to know the same fate in the Kennedy Round (GATT) negotiations235. 
On middle-term basis, discussions in Council, Commission or Parliament turned away from 
grand designs of further integration, and concentrated on technical matters236. In the short run, 
at a procedural level, France insisted on preliminary Commission contact with the member 
states through the permanent representatives at the council237. Equally, the Commission could 
not render public any document before their formal delivery to Member States238  and the 
presentation of letters of credence by third-party diplomats became the affair of the Council of 
Ministers, as well as the Commission’s president239. 
In the long run, the recognition of an essential national interest did not disappear, as 
Mosler thought it would240. Instead, it provided arguments for new member states, such as the 
United Kingdom (1972) to insist on concessions during the preparatory stage of Commission 
proposals241, and can still serve as a political pressure argument today, irrespective of the 
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precarious legal status of the (non-)agreement242. Its finality, however, is not that of provoking 
a rupture, but of moving the need for compromise on essential interests forward in the 
institutional mechanics. 
Section 3 : “L’intégration n’a rien de réciproque”243: France and NATO 
“Rien ne peut faire qu’une loi, sans amendement, 
s’impose, quand elle n’est plus en accord avec les 
mœurs. Rien ne peut faire qu’un traité soit valable 
intégralement quand son objet s’est modifié. Et rien 
ne peut faire qu’une alliance peut rester telle quelle, 
quand ont changé les conditions qui étaient celles 
dans lesquelles elle a été conclue.” 
Charles de Gaulle, press conference 21 February 
1966244. 
“General de Gaulle erklärte, Verteidigung sei nicht 
Strategie, sondern Politik, und die Politik eines 
Staates sei in erster Linie seine Verteidigung.” 
Conversation de Gaulle/Erhard, Paris, 21 November 
1963245 
NATO cancelled out France’s acquis at the UN Security Council: in New York, it held a 
position as a permanent member. At the NATO Council, la Grande Nation was just one of the 
club members. In Henry Kissinger’s words: 
“Given the nature of America's relations with the rest of the world, it seems strange that 
partnership should be said to be possible only among equals. The assertion that we can 
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deal effectively only with countries of equal strength is not conducive to inspiring 
confidence among the great majority of the nations of the world which are weak246.”  
From his taking of office as Prime Minister in June 1958 on247, de Gaulle considered an exit, 
or, to be more precise, a reminder of the Atlantic Treaty’s exact clauses. This especially in the 
light of the Treaty’s expiring in 1969248. At first, de Gaulle proposed President Eisenhower (24 
September 1958) to create a tripartite directorate of NATO, recalling the allied organisation 
during the war249. However, once this idea had vanished, France gradually distanced itself from 
the military organisation of the alliance250. The Republic retired its Mediterranean fleet from 
NATO-command (11 March 1959) and refused to have American bombers with nuclear 
warheads on its national territory (5 September 1960), arguing that the presence of nuclear 
weapons on French soil was incompatible with the lack of decision power on their use. Next, 
France refused to cooperate in a joint NATO air-alarm system, and, after the end of the Algerian 
conflict, did not integrate its returned divisions in the NATO system. From 1960 on, France 
started to work on its own “force de frappe”251. 
I. Prelude to separation 
“Que voulez-vous que j'en attende ? L'OTAN ne sert 
à rien: il ne peut rien s'y passer! Tout ça, c'est zéro, 
zéro, zéro. C'est fait pour faire vivre des 
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fonctionnaires internationaux qui se font payer 
grassement à ne rien faire, sans verser d'impôt.” 
de Gaulle on the May 1964 NATO summit252 
Initially, de Gaulle went for a “European” defence. When it became clear, with the failure of 
the Fouchet negotiations (1962) and the subsequent preamble to the Elysée Treaty (16 May 
1963), that this would not work, de Gaulle steered on a firmly national course253. On 27 April 
1964, de Gaulle withdrew the French officers from NATO’s naval command. Three months 
later, in his 23 July 1964 press conference, the General buried the German attempt to pool 
nuclear forces within NATO, by attacking the Multilateral Force (MLF), which would still 
mean that the Americans would decide on the effective use of nuclear power254. For the Federal 
Republic of Germany, “full integration255” meant access to participation on a vital defence 
issue. However, for France, it meant downgrading its autonomy. Consequently, although the 
idea had initially been put forward as a sign of America’s understanding of the Federal 
Republic’s feeling of discrimination256, Lyndon Johnson could only note the crisis within 
NATO, when he publicly abandoned the very idea of an MLF on 21 December 1964257. Yet, 
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this did not appease France: in May 1965, de Gaulle announced that his country would not take 
part in planned joint NATO manoeuvers. The decision to leave the integrated military structure 
had been taken by de Gaulle and Couve de Murville, ahead of the December 1965 Presidential 
elections258. 
II. Back to the treaty clauses ? French unilateral interpretation 
France did not leave the USA in a big suspense anymore: from 21 February (press conference) 
to the formal announcement on 31 March 1966, the retreat from any peri-contractual NATO 
structures (Military Committee, Permanent Group, Saceur259, Saclant260, Chinchan261) was 
formalised262. Alluding on the clausula rebus sic stantibus in international law263, de Gaulle 
argued that anything beyond a contractual alliance could not be binding anymore for France. 
Invoking national independence and sovereignty, NATO-troops were asked to leave the French 
national territory264. From a legal point of view, the decisions (unanimously) taken by the 
Atlantic Council, allowing for the creation of the commandment structures after the Korean 
War, were considered as merely indicative, and thus insufficiently explicit to limit French 
sovereignty265.  
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“Flabbergasted266” American diplomats saw De Gaulle as a “twentieth-century Don 
Quixote267”. Rationally looked at French (or British) independent fire power, a European 
nuclear defence without American participation would amount to “eine Kombination von 
Zwergen268”. Moreover, France did never question its fundamental allegiance to the United 
States in the world conflict, and –since 1776- had never engaged in a military confrontation 
with its ally overseas269. Finally, France was not deprived of its veto right within the NATO 
structures, which foresaw the Atlantic council’s supreme authority. Couve de Murville declared 
at the Assemblée Nationale that, indeed, the problem did not reside with the absence of a veto, 
but with the incompatible interests of the United States, which, as a global power, had potential 
casus belli, well outside of France’s reach:  
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“"Il ne s'agit pas tant de pouvoir faire ce que l'on veut que de ne pas être entrainé à faire ce que l'on ne 
veut pas.270” 
However, with regard to the very restricted probability of an actual military 
confrontation, Cold War-defence issues boiled down to psychological issues 271 . Both 
Washington’s and Moscow’s enormous military build-up could be termed “apocalyptic, and 
thus insignificant272”. The perception of a state’s capability to keep an aggressor at bay was not 
an absolute, but a relative phenomenon. An expensive investment in nuclear capabilities was 
not designed to wipe out any potential aggressor, but to affirm a minor power’s existence on 
the world stage in case of a conflict between the two big powers273. Consequently, the key issue 
for the two superpowers was to ensure their allies had confidence in the over-arching strategy. 
A purely theoretical or technological monopoly was insufficient, since the superpower would 
always intervene in case of a conflict involving its main competitor274. In the French case, 
“measures contradictory to those of the US were thus in a sense supported by the American 
nuclear umbrella275”. 
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De Gaulle had to have recourse to bilateral negotiations with the Federal Republic to station 
troops on its territory276. Isolated from Germany as well277, the French President publicly 
castigated Ludwig Erhard’s government (28 October 1966 press conference). Yet, in turn, 
Erhard could not afford to be portrayed an Einzelgänger within Germany278. Konrad Adenauer, 
who had retired from public office in 1963, had launched his attack far earlier, almost from the 
moment he resigned as Chancellor279. From the start of his tenure on, Erhard had the impression 
to be more supported by outside partners than within his own party280. Irrespective of the 
CDU/CSU-FDP coalition’s electoral victory in October 1965, Adenauer even asked for its 
replacement by a Grand Coalition with the SPD (3 January 1966)281. The day before de Gaulle’s 
public invective, the liberal ministers had resigned from Erhard’s government, leading to his 
personal exit (1 December 1966). The new Chancellor, Kiesinger, dropped his support for de 
Gaulle’s other opponent, Walter Hallstein, who could not preside over the newly merged 
European Commissions282. 
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De Gaulle’s attitude towards NATO has cast its long shadow on French Foreign policy283, as 
well as on the questions discussed within the alliance284. At the time of the 1966 decision, public 
opinion did not support de Gaulle’s NATO stance 285 . It took France until the Sarkozy 
presidency (2007-2012) to reintegrate the military structures286.   
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De Gaulle’s perturbing diplomatic action had a double objective. On the internal front, he 
strived to restore national pride after the Algerian imbroglio, and to mark a turn-around for the 
French economy. On the external front, he wanted to recall the perpetual rules of international 
relations to the hegemonic power within the Western bloc. Both were intimately linked287. The 
United States, imbued with a missionary conviction that their action would ultimately lead to 
stability and peace through the rule of law288, had to be reminded that the international society 
functioned as an arena. For de Gaulle, every state (including the new ones, created in the wave 
of decolonisation), had a legitimate claim to further its own national interest, irrespective of 
supranational order289. The order propagated by the Americans entailed a consensus around 
values which de Gaulle found naïve. For de Gaulle, there was no genuine “common 
international interest” behind the structure of the post-1945 international organizations, but 
merely badly disguised attempts to manipulate allies290. A Europe of States, “from the Atlantic 
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to the Ural”, did not distinguish between East and West, whereas, for Washington, including 
the former would be impossible291. 
Yet, distinct sets of values and geopolitically determined interests did not necessarily 
entail armed confrontation, but reflected a realist perspective on international relations. 
Polycentrism, echoing the horizontal order after the Peace of Utrecht (1713292) or the 19th 
Century Concert of Europe, was achievable. Not in terms of physical capability, but in terms of 
political decision centres, where international discourse could be mastered independent from 
the leading ally293. De Gaulle was convinced that his opinion was so self-evidently internally 
valid and reflected structural necessity for the international system, that history would prove 
him right294. 
The jurist’s position in specific political discourse is very close to complete apology. De Gaulle 
saw political will as the prima donna of international lawmaking (as the Luxemburg 
compromise, and the Fouchet proposals demonstrate) and relied on the unilateral interpretation 
of agreements (cf. the NATO decisions of 1966). Yet, de Gaulle’s advocacy of the international 
arena as one of confrontation did entail a minimum consensus on values. In itself, the promotion 
of a multipolar and egalitarian international society is a normative principle, relying on 
reciprocal consent and advantage, inextricably linked with a European tradition of diplomatic 
culture, which functions as the nurturing and mutually influenced infrastructure of legal 
discourse.  
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